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FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND THE HOBBS ACT: UNITED




On June 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the conviction of Judge Adam Stillo, Sr., and his nephew, at-
torney Joseph Stillo, for conspiracy to commit extortion under color of
official right.1 The Stillos had been charged with violations of the
Hobbs Act, a federal statute that broadly prohibits extortion or rob-
beries, or attempts or conspiracies to commit such acts, that interfere
with interstate commerce.2
Federal prosecutors established jurisdiction in the case by demon-
strating that the Stillos' extortive scheme would have reduced the
funds available to the victim, a local attorney, to buy office supplies
that had traveled in interstate commerce. 3 Such diminished purchas-
ing power has long been held sufficient under the Act to invoke fed-
eral protection.
4
Over the past fifty years there has been a gradual reduction in the
effect on interstate commerce necessary to permit federal intervention
under the Hobbs Act.5 During the period immediately following its
* J.D. 1997, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Professors Howard Eg-
lit, Stephen Sowle, and David C. Thomas of Chicago-Kent for their insights, their encourage-
ment, and their patience in the face of what must have seemed like an endless stream of
revisions.
1. See United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 555-57 (7th Cir. 1995). Judge Stillo was also
convicted of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1962(c) (1994). These charges stemmed in
part from a series of bribes he accepted over the decade ending in or about April 1987. See
discussion infra notes 89-102. See also United States v. Stillo, No. 91 CR 795-1-2, Oct. 3, 1991,
at 10 ("Indictment"); StiUo, 57 F.3d at 555-57. Federal racketeering charges were predicated on
violations of Illinois law prohibiting official misconduct, conspiracy, and bribery. See 38 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 8/2 (West 1996); 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. 33/1, 3 (West 1996).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994); see also infra note 16 and accompanying text.
3. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558-59.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 60 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Auguello, 451 F.2d 1167, 1170 (2d Cir.
1971); United States v. Esperti, 406 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1969); see also infra notes 41-69 and
accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating $68 depletion
of the coffee-purchase fund of a local social club sufficed); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53,
59 (7th Cir. 1975) ("[A] threatened effect on interstate commerce is sufficient."); United States
v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 683 (3d Cir. 1964) (stating extortion by local Teamster official of
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passage in 1946, jurisdiction was generally linked to some direct and
substantial effect on interstate commerce. The use or threat of force
or violence would halt work, and therefore the flow of goods traveling
in interstate commerce necessary to complete the work, unless the vic-
tim complied with the extortive demand. Beginning in the mid-1960s,
prosecutors began instead to consider the victim's payment as a means
to sustain jurisdiction. Compliance with the demand threatened inter-
state commerce indirectly by reducing the victim's ability to make fu-
ture purchases of goods. Courts presented with this "depletion of
assets" theory have neither imposed nor implied a monetary floor be-
low which an effect on interstate commerce would be considered in-
sufficient to permit federal intervention. Indeed, the legislative
history and categorical language of the statute-"[w]hoever in any
way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce" 6-suggest a full exercise of
power under the Commerce Clause.7 It is thus unlikely that such a
lower limit would exist as the statute is now written, unless that limit is
required by the Constitution.
Legislative intention "to use all the constitutional power Con-
gress has to punish interference with interstate commerce" has per-
mitted an expansion of jurisdiction largely unforeseen in 1946.8
Arguably, this expansion has simply tracked the growth of a unified
national economy during this century. Using the holding in United
States v. Stillo, however, I will attempt to demonstrate that the courts
themselves have actively, if not eagerly, contributed to the Act's juris-
dictional breadth.9 While the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
$17,000 from trucking company to prevent labor slowdowns and disruptions sufficied). See also
infra notes 24, 40-88 and accompanying text.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994). See also infra note 14-17 and accompanying text.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Villareal, 764 F.2d 1048, 1049-50 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving
conspiracy to extort protection money from massage parlors); Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 589-90;
United States v. Arena, 984 F. Supp. 580, 584-85 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding federal jurisdiction
where anti-abortion activist engaged in attacks on a Planned Parenthood clinic, thereby deplet-
ing the assets used to purchase goods traveling in interstate commerce); see also United States v.
Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the Hobbs Act in no way precludes prose-
cutions for "garden-variety," isolated or local robberies provided prosecutors also satisfy the
provision that interstate commerce be affected in some way); United States v. Jones, 30 F.3d 276,
284-85 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that robbery during illegal drug sale affected interstate commerce
because the assets available to the victim drug dealer would be depleted, thereby affecting his
ability to purchase additional cocaine that had traveled in interstate commerce); United States v.
Fernandez, No. 93 Cr. 386 (SWK), 1993 WL 362392 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,1993) (upholding juris-
diction where defendants conspired to rob furniture store owner who had brought the store
proceeds home for safe keeping).
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cuit, far more frequently than other federal courts of appeals, has
evinced a willingness to uphold federal jurisdiction based on truly de
minimis effects on interstate commerce, 10 United States v. Stillo is, for
the most part, representative of cases in all circuits analyzed under a
depletion of assets theory. Nevertheless, language and reasoning in
the opinion suggest the means by which the jurisdictional element has
gradually been relaxed.
There are strong arguments both for and against the "federaliza-
tion" of criminal law, as the Stillo decision and the investigation of
which it was a part suggest." While consideration of the wisdom of an
expanded federal role in criminal law is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, it is beyond argument that a corrupt judiciary goes far towards
undermining the foundation of an ordered society. Federal interven-
tion seems particularly appropriate where corruption is pervasive and
local officials lack the will or the resources to restore the integrity of
local institutions. 12 Such action is not without cost, however: paradox-
ically, the nation's federal structure may be undermined by interven-
tion intended to preserve democratic institutions. One may likewise
legitimately speculate that an expansionist federal policy hinders,
rather than fosters, local solutions to such problems.
Part II of this Comment will present an overview of the Act's
legislative history. The section will specifically trace the evolution of
the de minimis effects and the depletion of assets theories, the adop-
tion of which have largely shaped modern Hobbs Act prosecutions.
In Part III, I will set out the facts of Stillo and the defendants' jurisdic-
tional challenges. I will then examine the court's reasoning and the
case law upon which it rests. Finally, I will review the court's assess-
ment of United States v. Lopez' 3 and its effect on the ability of federal
prosecutors to sustain jurisdiction based on de minimis effects on in-
terstate commerce.
10. Compare sources cited infra note 60, with sources cited infra notes 130, 158.
11. For discussions on the expansion of federal criminal law in general, see, for example,
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4.10, at 413-16 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1995); Symposium: Federalization of Crime: The Roles of
the Federal and State Governments in the Criminal Justice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967 (1995);
Stephen Chippendale, More Harm than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79
MINN. L. REV. 455, 463-66, 468-71 (1994); Tracy W. Resch, The Scope of Federal Criminal Juris-
diction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 LAW FORUM 805, 820-23; Robert L. Stern, The CCL
Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 271 (1973); Herbert J. Stern,
Prosecutions of Local Political Corruption under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction
Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SETON HALL. L. REV. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Stern]; see also
infra note 138.
12. See infra note 138.
13. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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The court's handling of the jurisdictional question in Stillo is not
entirely satisfying. Whether or not this lack of rigor is-or should
be-sufficient in our bifurcated political structure to permit federal
intervention, the treatment of the jurisdictional element is representa-
tive of the level of analysis demonstrated by most courts. I conclude
that the expansion of federal jurisdiction is likely to continue until the
judiciary itself is willing to recognize principled limitations on its abil-
ity to reach criminal conduct, even where it appears that there may be
compelling reasons to permit such intervention.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT OF
THE HOBBS ACT
The Hobbs Act was enacted in 1946 as an amendment to the
Anti-Racketeering Act of June 18, 1934.14 The language of the new
amendment was broadly written and has been consistently interpreted
as a full exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause. 15 The Act provides in part:
14. The Hobbs Act was passed in 1946. Minor revisions of no substantive import were
made in 1948, and the act has remained unchanged since that time. See infra notes 15-22 and
accompanying text. The Anti-Racketeering Act, which preceded the Hobbs Act, provided in
pertinent part:
Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any
degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or about to
move in trade or commerce
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use force,
violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations, or the
purchase or rental of property or protective services, not including, however, the pay-
ment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee, or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force
or fear, or under color of official right; or
(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical injury to a
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate (sub) sections (a) or
(d)....
The Anti-Racketeering Act, ch. 569, § 420(a), § 2, 48 Stat. 979 (repealed 1946). For discussions
of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, see United States v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 528-31
(1942); Comment: Prosecutions under the Hobbs Act and the Expansion of Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306, 308-12 (1975) [hereinafter Expansion]; A Note
on the Racketeering, Bank Robbery, and "Kick-Back" Laws, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 445,
446-47 & n.5 (1934).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978) ("[T]he statutory language
sweeps within it all persons who have 'in any way or degree affect[ed] commerce ... by robbery
or extortion.' These words do not lend themselves to restrictive interpretation .. ") (alteration
in original) (citation omitted); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (stating that the Act
manifests a purpose "to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with
interstate commerce."); United States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1190 (1st Cir. 1979); United
States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 1973). In Battaglia v. United States, 383 F.2d 303, 305
(9th Cir. 1967), the court traced congressional power to protect interstate commerce, citing
NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212
(1960); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1
(1937); and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects com-
merce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce,
by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or com-
mits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in fur-
therance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this
section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.
1 6
An effect on interstate commerce attributable to the proscribed
conduct is thus an express element of the statute.
Congress intended the Hobbs Act to address shortcomings in the
Anti-Racketeering Act that had been highlighted by the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Local 807.17 Congressman Sam
Hobbs of Alabama, the major sponsor of the legislation, acknowl-
edged that the terms "extortion" and "robbery" were familiar com-
mon law terms in every legislator's lexicon. 18 Nonetheless, added
another Congressmen, the language in the Anti-Racketeering Act "is
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994). The Hobbs Act also defines certain key terms:
(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property
from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or
threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or
property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a rela-
tive or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or
obtaining.
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his con-
sent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under
color of official right.
(3) The term "commerce" means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any
Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State,
Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all
commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State;
and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1996). For discussions of the legislative history of the Hobbs Act, see Culbert,
435 U.S. at 374-78; Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 590-93 (1961); United States v.
Varlack, 225 F.2d 665, 671-72 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889, 891-92 (3d
Cir. 1952); Expansion, supra note 14, at 308-12. See also United States v. Green, 358 U.S. 415,
418-20 & n.5 (1956).
17. 315 U.S. 521 (1942); see 89 CONG. REC. 3210 (1943) (remarks of Congressman Han-
cock). Out-of-state truckers arriving at the outskirts of Manhattan in 1941 were being halted
and threatened at barricades set up by members of Teamsters' Local 807. See Local 807, 315
U.S. at 525-31. Local Teamsters were demanding from non-local, non-member drivers that they
pay fees that corresponded to a day's wage, at union rates, for the right to proceed. See id.; see
also 89 CONG. REC. at 3210, 3214-15. At issue in the subsequent litigation was a specific provi-
sion in the Anti-Racketeering Act exempting lawful activities undertaken to secure "the pay-
ment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee," enacted to shield lawful union
strike activity. Local 807, 315 U.S. at 529 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 420(a)2(A)). The Supreme Court
recognized in the Act two firm congressional directives: "[F]irst, the elimination of terroristic
activities by professional gangsters was the aim of the statute, and second, [sic] no interference
with union activities was intended." Id. at 530. Given the apparent clarity of congressional
purpose, the Court interpreted the Anti-Racketeering Act so as to shield those members of the
union who had been prosecuted. See id. at 531, 535-36.
18. These terms "have been construed a thousand times by the courts. Everybody knows
what they mean." 91 CONG. REc. 11,912 (1945) (comments of S. Rep. Hobbs).
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too general, and we thought it better to make this bill explicit, and
leave nothing to the imagination of the Court." 19 Following the pas-
sage of the Hobbs Act, prosecutors generally used the statute as a tool
to attack the sort of disruptive activities that the drafters of both the
Anti-Racketeering Act and the Hobbs Act had decried at length dur-
ing the legislative debates.20 This included "typical racketeering activ-
ities [such as] price fixing and extortion directed by professional
gangsters,"' 21 and illegal labor practices.
22
For example, in Hulahan v. United States23 the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction of a corrupt union repre-
sentative charged with conspiracy and attempting to extort $50,000 to
ensure labor peace during the construction of a housing develop-
ment.24 Defendant Hulahan emphasized the local nature of his con-
19. 91 CONG. REC. 11,904 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Hancock) (quoted in Culbert, 435 U.S. at
378); see also id. at 11,912 (remarks of Rep. Hobbs).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1964) (involving extortion
by local Teamster official to prevent labor slowdowns and disruptions); United States v. Ken-
nedy, 291 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1962) (involving conspiracy to obstruct interstate trucking ship-
ments); United States v. Persico, 305 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1962) (finding conviction for hijacking a
truckload of goods moving in interstate commerce and conspiring to do so); United States v.
Floyd, 228 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1956) (involving threats of labor disruption leveled against a local
company engaged in the construction of an interstate crude oil pipeline); United States v.
Varlack, 225 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1955) (finding labor union representatives allegedly orchestrating
strikes threatened additional unrest "unless we are taken care of" by interstate shipper); Calla-
nan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1955) (involving extortion of $28,000 from construc-
tion company to prevent labor slowdowns and disruptions during the construction of an
interstate pipeline); Kemble, 198 F.2d at 890 (finding non-union truck driver attempting to de-
liver freight that had been hauled interstate was met by union representative using threats and
violence to prevent the driver from unloading the shipment); see also Stern, supra note 11, at
3-9, 14 n.59; 31A AM. JUR., Extortion §§ 74-110 (1989); NORMAN ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 32-40 (1986).
21. Letter from the Attorney General to the House Committee on the Judiciary of May 18,
1934, quoted in Local 807, 315 U.S. at 529. Senator Copeland commented that the Act was
intended to "close gaps in existing Federal laws and to render more difficult the activities of
predatory criminal gangs of the Kelly and Dillinger types." Local 807, 315 U.S. at 528-30.
Though the Copeland Committee did not define the term "racket," they "found that the
term... had 'for some time been used loosely to designate every conceivable sort of practice or
activity which was either questionable, unmoral, fraudulent, or even disliked, whether criminal
or not."' Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 375 (1978) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1189 (1937)).
22. See 91 CONG. REC. 11,899-912 (1945); see also Randy J. Curato et al, Note, Government
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: A Practical Guide to Fighting Official Corruption, 58 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027, 1049-50 (1983).
23. 214 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1954).
24. See id. at 443-44. Similarly, in Floyd, 228 F.2d at 915-16, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction of an Illinois Teamsters' Union business agent who had
extorted $2,650 from contractors engaged in the construction of a $52,000,000 interstate oil pipe-
line. The defendant threatened disruptive labor activity unless he was paid $25.00 per mile as
the line passed through his one hundred six mile union jurisdiction. See id.; see also United
States v. Dale, 223 F.2d 181,182-83 (7th Cir. 1955) (involving conspiracy and attempt to extort
$1,030,000 from contractors engaged in the construction of a power plant to furnish interstate
electrical power); Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 185-86 (8th Cir. 1955) (involving extor-
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duct.25 The government countered that the lumber, bath tubs and
other fixtures used on the project were being shipped from outside the
state to the construction site on an as-needed basis.26 The court
agreed that these shipments adequately tied local activities to inter-
state commerce, and concluded that "the exaction of tribute from con-
tractors engaged in local construction work who are dependent upon
interstate commerce for materials, equipment, and supplies" fell
within the scope of conduct the Hobbs Act was enacted to prevent.
27
Because the Act proscribes the wrongful use of "threatened
force, violence, or fear," the Court of Appeals concluded that no ac-
tual effect on interstate commerce was required. 28 The court noted
that Congress had intended to prevent both actual disruptions of in-
terstate commerce as well as potential disruptions caused by the
threat of illegal strikes, slowdowns or violence. 29 The Hulahan court
relied on Nick v. United States,30 an earlier Eighth Circuit case in
which the court determined that the Anti-Racketeering Act "evinces
an intention of the Congress to cover the entire constitutional range of
interstate commerce in its prohibition of racketeering .... All that is
necessary is that the conspiracy shall be to do something, the natural
tion of $15,312 from contractors engaged in interstate pipeline projects where defendants
threatened violence and the continuation of a labor strike).
25. See Hulahan, 214 F.2d at 443, 445.
26. See id. at 443.
27. Id. at 445. In so holding, the court approved of a jury instruction that stated:
I charge you, as a matter of law, that if you believe the testimony of the Government
witnesses with reference to the bringing of various materials, commodities, and equip-
ment, from out of state to the job sites in question in this federal judicial district, then
you are instructed that defendant's activities as shown by the Government's testimony,
if you believe the same, did delay, obstruct and affect interstate commerce as that lan-
guage is used in the statutes under which these charges are brought. That is to say, if
you find the facts to be as testified to by the Government's witnesses, the Court has
determined as a matter of law that there has been a substantial effect in interstate
commerce shown here by the United States and that question is not for your
determination.
Id. (citing Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660, 673 (8th Cir. 1941), for that court's approval of a
"similar instruction").
28. Id. at 444-45 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1992)); see supra note 14. It has been sug-
gested that limiting prosecution to those who actually carry out their threats might serve to
"reward" those who could create a level of fear in their victims sufficiently high so as to make
payment of the extortive demands a virtual certainty. See Expansion, supra note 14, at 312.
29. See Hulahan, 214 F.2d at 444 ("We have no doubt that Congress has the power to deal
with extortion or attempted extortion actually or potentially affecting interstate commerce, just
as it has the power to deal with unfair labor practices so affecting interstate commerce."). In
support for its position, the court cited NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939), a civil labor
relations case brought under the National Labor Relations Act. The Fainblatt Court observed
that "the power of Congress extends to the protection of interstate commerce from interference
or injury due to activities which are wholly intrastate." 306 U.S. at 605; see also id. at n.1.
30. 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1941).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
effect of which will be to affect interstate commerce."' 31 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit likewise quoted the Nick holding,
commenting in United States v. Varlack32 that nothing in the legislative
history of the Hobbs Act indicated an intent to restrict or otherwise
diminish the reach of the original Anti-Racketeering Act.33
In 1960 the Supreme Court confirmed this expansive interpreta-
tion.34 Stirone v. United States35 involved a union official indicted for
31. Id. at 668, 673; see also United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524, 526, 528-29 (2d Cir.
1944). Nick involved an extortive labor scheme advanced by a St. Louis union official who con-
trolled a local motion picture operators' union. See Nick, 122 F.2d at 664-65. The defendant
threatened to call for strikes and shutdowns unless he received a $10,000 fee, subsequently re-
duced to $6,500. See id. at 667. The appellate court, relying on Fainblatt, noted:
There the effect was upon the origination of interstate commerce. The situation before
us affects the termination or purpose of interstate commerce and is just as effective in
preventing such commerce .... If exhibitors are prevented or seriously obstructed in
exhibiting the films they will not buy them. If exhibitors will not buy the films they will
not be shipped in interstate commerce.... [I]n either case, the films will not be shipped
because of the obstruction.
Id. at 668.
Hobbs Act defenses based on the "stream of commerce" theory-the goods affected by a
defendant's extortive conduct have already left the stream of interstate commerce, thereby bar-
ring federal intervention-have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., United States v. Crowley,
504 F.2d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967)); United States v.
Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 147 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253-58 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942));
see also infra notes 36 and 63. But see United States v. Waters, 850 F. Supp. 1550, 1561-62 (N.D.
Ala. 1994) ("A run-over pedestrian undoubtedly might constitute a greater interference with
traffic than anything reflected in the evidence in this case. This court agrees with United States v.
Blair. ... in which that court... note[d] that the one-time simple purchase of an item which had
already 'come to rest' inside a state would not automatically provide an effect on interstate
commerce."); United States v. Blair, 762 F. Supp. 1384, 1393 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("It appears
that this neutral purchase of an item 'come to rest' in-state would not have any effect on inter-
state commerce.").
32. 225 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1955).
33. See id. at 668-70, 672. Quoting the "natural effect" jury instruction approved in Nick,
the Varlack court noted, "We have no doubt that the same is true under the statute in its present
form and, in this regard, we appear to be in agreement with the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit .... " Id. at 672.
34. The Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the Hobbs Act until
1956, in United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956). The district court found no Hobbs Act
violations where union members attempted to obtain jobs and wages through the use of threats
and violence. See United States v. Green, 135 F. Supp. 162, 163 (S.D. Ill. 1955). The lower court
had suggested that the defendant might be operating within his legal rights and responsibilities in
attempting to induce an employer to engage the services of union labor, even if the services were
unwanted. See id. The Supreme Court disagreed, remarking pointedly that the legislative his-
tory of the Hobbs Act made it clear that "attempts to get personal property through threats of
force or violence" were not legitimate labor activities because "[t]he Hobbs Act was meant to
stop just such conduct." Green, 350 U.S. at 421. The Court likewise observed that since the
legislation was intended for the "protection of interstate commerce against injury from extor-
tion,... racketeering affecting interstate commerce was within federal legislative control." Id. at
420-21; see also United States v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1959); Bianchi v. United States,
219 F.2d 182, 190-91 (8th Cir. 1955).
35. 361 U.S. 212, 213-14 (1960).
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allegedly threatening labor disruption during the construction of a
proposed steel mill. The sand used to produce the concrete had been
shipped into Pennsylvania from out of state.36 The Supreme Court
agreed with the lower courts that such interstate shipments entitled
the victim to federal protection. The Court remarked, "[Tlhat Act
speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the consti-
tutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate
commerce by extortion, robbery, or physical violence. The Act out-
laws interference 'in any way or degree.'" 37 The Court articulated
some cautionary observations, however:
[T]here are two essential elements of a Hobbs Act crime: interfer-
ence with commerce, and extortion. Both elements have to be
charged. Neither is surplusage and neither can be treated as sur-
plusage. The charge that interstate commerce is affected is critical
since the Federal Government's jurisdiction of this crime rests only
on that interference.
38
It was unclear whether Stirone's conviction had been upheld in
part on the basis of the potential effect on interstate commerce of the
mill's delayed steel shipments, a factor unmentioned in the original
indictment. It was likewise unclear "whether the grand jury would
have concluded in its indictment a charge that commerce in steel from
a nonexistent steel mill might have been interfered with."' 39 The
Court therefore reversed.
While the expansive Stirone passage has been cited or quoted in
the vast majority of subsequent Hobbs Act cases, the cautionary pas-
36. See United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 572 (3d Cir. 1958), affg 168 F. Supp. 490,
495-96 (W.D. Penn. 1957). The defendant had argued unsuccessfully that interstate commerce
had ended with the delivery into Pennsylvania of the sand, and its subsequent transformation
into concrete at the victim's plant. See Stirone, 168 F. Supp. at 495-96. The district court replied:
[Tihe power of Congress to regulate commerce is plenary and the power to regulate
includes the power to protect commerce 'no matter what the source of the dangers
which threaten it.' . . . [T]he only criteria which this court may properly employ to
determine whether the act is applicable are whether the channels of interstate com-
merce have been used and whether the free passage of articles therein has been
threatened.
Id. at 496 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
37. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951).
38. Id. at 218. The Court's decision hinged on the insufficiency of the defendant's indict-
ment. Over the objections of Stirone's attorney, the trial court had permitted jury consideration
of the possibility that interstate commerce could be affected by disruption of steel shipments
from the plant yet to be built. The indictment charged only that Stirone had burdened interstate
commerce by his threats to disrupt the sand shipments into Pennsylvania. See id. at 214-15.
39. Id. at 219. The Court noted, "[w]hether prospective steel shipments from the new steel
mills would be enough, alone, to bring this transaction under the Act is a more difficult ques-
tion," one the Court could not, and did not, address. Id. at 215. Compare id., with United States
v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc) and infra text accompanying notes 74-86. Cf.
United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 378-79, 385-86 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that Stirone is
the "classic case of an impermissible broadening of the charges").
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sage, far closer to the core of the Court's holding, has largely gone
unnoticed.
A. Evolution of the Depletion of Assets Theory
For the first two decades following the passage of the Hobbs Act,
prosecutors generally used the statute to combat the extortion of rela-
tively valuable property or large sums of money, as well as attempts or
conspiracies to engage in such extortion.4 0 Nevertheless, an early dis-
trict court decision, United States v. Malinsky,41 set forth in sweeping
terms the proposition that the Act might also apply to activities of
little or no economic consequence:
The statute provides that effect "in any way or degree" is sufficient.
Congress itself has concluded that any effect upon interstate com-
merce in any degree caused by extortion or conspiracy contemplat-
ing extortion is in itself substantial. The substantiality of the effect
is not left to judicial determination. The only question is whether
the prohibited activity is within the reach of Congress.
4 2
Malinsky, which has been widely cited,43 helped to prepare the
way for several decisions that drastically reduced the effect on inter-
state commerce necessary to support jurisdiction under the Act.
In contrast to this relatively early suggestion that even a de
40. See, e.g., United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 1967) (extorting $16,000
for the issuance of a building permit); United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 683 (3d Cir.
1964) (extorting $17,000 over a period of seven years to avoid labor disruptions); United States
v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1957) (extorting $10,000 to end a union strike); United
States v. Dale, 223 F.2d 181, 182 (7th Cir. 1955) (involving attempted extortion of a total of
$1,037,500 on a construction project); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 173 (8th Cir. 1955)
(extorting $28,000 for labor peace during the construction of an interstate pipeline); United
States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665, 667-69 (2d Cir. 1955) (involving approximately $11,000 and an
initial demand that the victims "give each of us $2,500 and ... a Chevrolet car, and that you
place each of us on the payroll at $50 a week"); see also supra notes 20, 24 and accompanying
text.
41. 19 F.R.D. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
42. Id. at 428 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120 (1941)) (applying the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 and interpreting congressional power to reach and regulate admit-
tedly local activities under the Commerce Clause)). It is arguable that determining the "substan-
tiality of the effect" has been left to the judiciary. The belief that Congress has exercised its full
power under the Commerce Clause leaves unanswered the questions of the full extent of that
power and who is to determine its measure. Moreover, the Court's recent decision in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) suggests an increased role for the judiciary in determining
the "substantiality of the effect" on interstate commerce necessary to sustain jurisdiction under
the Commerce Clause. Malinsky, 19 F.R.D. at 428. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603-615 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Expansion, supra note 14, at 318-19; see infra notes 222-58 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Boston, 718 F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 837 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir.
1969); United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 49 (7th Cir. 1968); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d
718, 732 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Barna, 442 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (W.D. Pa. 1978); see also
infra notes 52, 111.
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minimis effect on commerce might warrant federal intervention, it was
not until eighteen years after the passage of the Act that it occurred to
anyone that federal jurisdiction might be sustained by focusing on the
victim's impaired ability to make future purchases. In 1964, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction of Teamster
official Anthony Provenzano for extorting monthly payoffs from a
trucking firm directly engaged in interstate commerce. 44 In its charge
to the jury, the trial court twice explained that the depletion of the
firm's assets by the defendant's extortive conduct permitted the rea-
sonable inference that business operations might be obstructed,
delayed, or affected.45 One of the court's instructions read:
If you find from the evidence that money was obtained from [the
victim trucking company] by way of extortion . . . you may infer
from that fact that payments of money made did in some way or
degree obstruct or delay or affect the business in which [the victim]
was engaged. Where the resources of a business are depleted or
diminished in any manner or degree by payments of money ob-
tained by extortion the capacity to efficiently conduct such business
is to the extent of the drain on its resources likely to be impaired.
46
The jury convicted him. On appeal, Provenzano argued that "the
mere payment of money" did not constitute obstruction of interstate
commerce under the statute.47 The appellate court, assessing the jury
instruction in light of the expansive language in Stirone v. United
States,48 disagreed:
We can perceive no reason why extortive payments, in substantial
amounts, paid as here from the treasury of a company engaged in
interstate commerce in order to avoid obstruction of the company's
interstate business should not be deemed to affect commerce and
therefore to lie within the proscription of the Hobbs Act. This was
the substance of the court's charge. We hold it to have been a cor-
rect one in light of all the circumstances.
49
United States v. Provenzano is apparently the first instance in
which a court held that the effect on interstate commerce necessary to
support federal jurisdiction could be supported by a depletion of a
firm's assets.50 When the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
44. See United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 683 (3d Cir. 1964). The case involved a
series of monthly sums paid by the trucking firm to an attorney for fictitious legal services. See
id. at 687.
45. See id. at 693.
46. Id. at 692.
47. Id. at 693.
48. 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960); see also supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
49. Provenzano, 334 F.2d at 693.
50. For holdings which tend to corroborate this statement, see United States v. Inigo, 925
F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 1979); United
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applied the theory four years later in United States v. Amabile,51 the
court quoted from the Provenzano trial court's emphatic jury instruc-
tion rather than the appellate court's opinion. 52 The language in
Amabile was thus considerably less provisional than Provenzano. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit subsequently adopted the
stronger formulation.
53
In so doing, however, the court emphasized that in United States
v. Addonizio the victimized construction firms, pressured to pay a to-
tal of nearly one million dollars in illegal payoffs, were also interstate
companies directly involved in interstate projects or projects benefit-
ing other interstate companies.
54
In 1971, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit linked the
depletion of assets theory to the expansive language of the Hobbs Act
in United States v. Auguello.55 Auguello's conviction was based in part
on three $100 cash payments made by the victim, the owner of a res-
taurant. One of the payments had been taken directly from the res-
taurant's cash register.56 The government's indictment sought to
establish the link to interstate commerce by arguing that the restau-
rant's meat products had been purchased from out of state. The de-
fendant countered that the victim was a private party who had paid
with personal funds, 57 thus the link to interstate commerce was simply
non-existent. The court was unpersuaded. The Court of Appeals ex-
States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 60 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Auguello, 451 F.2d 1167, 1170
(2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Esperti, 406 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Expansion,
supra note 14, at 314.
51. 395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968) (extorting of $48,500 from a management company engaged
in the construction of an apartment complex).
52. See id. at 49. The Amabile court quoted Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305
(1964), and Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1955). See 395 F.2d at 49. The
court also noted that "[i]t is unnecessary that the extortion have as substantial an effect on inter-
state commerce as a combination in restraint of trade." Id. (citing United States v. Malinsky, 19
F.R.D. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)); see also United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304, 312 (7th Cir.
1968).
53. See Addonizio, 451 F.2d at 76-77 (citing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215
(1960); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir. 1969); Amabile, 395 F.2d at 49;
United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665, 672 (2d Cir. 1955); Hulahan, 214 F.2d at 445; Nick v.
United States, 122 F.2d 660, 673 (8th Cir. 1941)).
54. See 451 F.2d at 54-57, 60.
55. 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971).
56. See id. at 1068-69. The first payment had come from the victim's own pocket, and the
third was made with money supplied by law enforcement officials. See id. The defendant had
also demanded $250 per month for the victim "to be with" the defendant and fifty percent of the
proceeds if the restaurant were ever sold. Id. The Auguello court relied on an earlier Second
Circuit decision, United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir. 1969), in which the court
had emphasized that "interference or attempted interference with interstate commerce 'in any
way or degree' is prohibited. Stated differently, extortion or threats of violence need affect in-
terstate commerce only in a minimal degree to constitute a violation."
57. Auguello, 451 F.2d at 1169.
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plained that the "providential fact" that the victim contacted the po-
lice before his business was demonstrably affected by the extortive
demands did not remove the case from the reach of federal
protection:
Given the sweeping power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause ... ,it is enough that the extortion 'in any way or degree'
affects commerce, though its effects be merely potential or subtle.
Here, depletion of Happy-Burger's resources, which by itself may
impair the efficient conduct of its business sufficiently to affect com-
merce, was shown at the very least by the September 5, 1968 pay-
ment taken directly from Happy-Burger's cash register.
58
The defendant's demand for monthly protection payments and a
fifty percent share of the profits upon the sale of the restaurant was no
doubt considered by the court in reaching its decision. Nevertheless,
the language of the holding permitted-even encouraged-the infer-
ence that the single $100 payment made from the restaurant's cash
register was sufficient to trigger application of the Hobbs Act.
59
Though the Court of Appeals relied on familiar language from widely-
cited cases, the Auguello holding indicated the court's willingness to
sustain jurisdiction based on a de minimis indirect effect on interstate
commerce.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit quickly adopted
and vigorously applied the notion that a de minimis depletion of a
firm's assets through extortive payments was sufficient to permit fed-
eral intervention. The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous cases
prosecuted under this theory during 1973 and 1974.60 In the first,
58. Id. at 1169-70 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964); Stirone v.
United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960); Tropiano, 418 F.2d at 1076-77; United States v.
Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 692 (3d Cir. 1964); Hulahan, 214 F.2d at 445)). Compare id. (finding
that the "providential fact" that police intervened before an effect on interstate commerce be-
came substantial does not defeat federal jurisdiction), with United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d
53, 60 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (finding that the "fortuitous circumstance" that a change in plans
following the extortive payment made an effect on interstate commerce impossible did not de-
feat federal jurisdiction).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486, 492 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Auguello
for the proposition that "$100 taken directly from restaurant's cash register to pay extortionist
showed depletion of assets, 'which by itself may impair the efficient conduct of [restaurant's]
business sufficiently to affect commerce"'); United States v. Flores, 855 F. Supp. 638, 640
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Auguello for the proposition that the jurisdictional element was satisfied
where the victim met the extortive demand "with $100 from the restaurant cash register").
60. See United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974) (involving shakedowns for
protection of 53 taverns and nightclubs by members of the vice squad at $150 per month per
establishment); United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1974) (involving six monthly
payments of $100 made by bowling alley operators to police for protection from local violence);
United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974) (involving $150 payment by the mother of a
tavern owner to a clerk in city hall in order to secure a liquor license); United States v. Devitt,
499 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1974) (involving payments in unnamed amounts made by four tavern
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United States v. DeMet,61 the court explained:
The effect on interstate commerce would exist, though small by
most standards, and only indirectly caused by defendant's acts....
[G]iven the existence of an impact on interstate commerce, the
question is whether the Hobbs Act must be construed as stopping
some margin short of full application of the commerce power.
6 2
The DeMet court differentiated between statutes that "regulate activi-
ties 'in commerce"' and those that "regulate matters 'affecting' inter-
state commerce," reasoning that the former category represented only
a partial exercise of federal power.63 The court concluded that the
Hobbs Act constituted a full exercise of Congress' power under the
Conimerce Clause, therefore "extortionate conduct having an argua-
bly de minimis effect on commerce may nevertheless be punished. '64
The holding was not unqualified, however, since the court determined
that the victim must "customarily" purchase goods or inventory com-
ing from outside the state before a depletion of assets warranted fed-
eral protection.65 No court, before DeMet or since, has articulated a
threshold level below which an effect on interstate commerce will be
dismissed as inconsequential. This is understandable: the language of
the statute is broad and its legislative history indicates that protection
owners to police for protection); United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1973) (involving
$300 payment to police by tavern owner to prevent the loss of his liquor license for sale to a
minor); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973) (involving payment by a tavern
owner to police of two monthly $50 sums and a case of liquor worth approximately $300 to avoid
enforcement of a local late-night parking ban); United States v. Pacente, 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir.
1974) (en banc), rev'g 490 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1973) (involving $200 payment to police by liquor
store owner to avoid arrest for allegedly selling to a minor).
61. 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973).
62. Id. at 821.
63. Id. at 821; see also id. at 821 n.4; Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 & n.4 (1985)
("The reference to ... any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce expresses an intent
by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause."); Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1977) ("Congress is aware of the 'distinction between legislation
limited to activities "in commerce" and an assertion of its full Commerce Clause power so as to
cover all activity substantially affecting interstate commerce."'). The DeMet court quoted Wall-
ing v. Goldblatt Bros., 128 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1942), a civil case addressing the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and the stream of commerce argument. The court also quoted Stirone v.
United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960), and cited Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); and Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942). See DeMet, 486 F.2d at 821-22; see also id. at 821 n.4.
64. DeMet, 486 F.2d at 822 (citing United States v. Auguello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971);
Battaglia v. United States, 383 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1967)). The court felt neither compelled
nor authorized to formulate a test under which an impact on interstate commerce would be
dismissed as de minimis. See id. at 822 n.5.
65. See id. at 822; see also United States v. Flores, 855 F. Supp. 638, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
("[I]t is the victim's purchase of items in interstate commerce that ... must be ongoing, not the
criminal conduct that impairs the ability to purchase.").
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of interstate commerce was the goal of the Act's sponsors.66 The
Supreme Court's explications in Stirone v. United States67 and United
States v. Culbert68 further encourage expansive interpretation. Cur-
rently, the de minimis threshold for a Hobbs Act prosecution appears
to lie somewhere between sixty-eight dollars and "eighty cents and a
near-empty pouch of chewing tobacco. '69
B. The Devolution from "Affects Commerce" to "Realistic
Probability"
The Hobbs Act prohibits conspiracies and attempts to rob or ex-
tort that would affect interstate commerce if successfully completed.
The courts have never insisted that a conspiracy be carried out, an
attempt be successful, or a threat to use force or violence actually be
executed to secure a criminal conviction. 70 In United States v. Jan-
notti,71 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained the ra-
tionale: "The ultimate failure of the conspiracy may diminish, but
does not eliminate, the threat it poses to social order; therefore, the
illegality of the agreement does not depend on the achievement of its
ends."'72 Similarly, where a defendant has been charged with conspir-
acy or attempted extortion, the courts have consistently sustained fed-
66. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 11903-06, 11910-13 (1945); see also H.R. REP. No. 80-238
(1947). No doubt the chiding given the Supreme Court by members of the legislature for what
they regarded as a misjudgment of congressional intent has helped to clarify the Court's under-
standing of the goals of the statute's framers. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REC. 11905, 11907 (comments
of Congressman Robinson and Representative Fellows); see also supra notes 14-22 and accom-
panying text.
67. 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) ("That Act speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to
use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce.
The Act outlaws interference 'in any way or degree."') (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)).
68. 435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978 ) ("[T]he statutory language sweeps within it all persons who
have 'in any way or degree affect[ed] commerce . . . by robbery or extortion.' These words do
not lend themselves to restrictive interpretation .... ") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
The Court also noted, "Congress intended to make criminal all conduct within the reach of the
statutory language." Id. at 379-80.
69. United States v. Quigley, 53 F.3d 909, 910-11 (8th Cir. 1995). Prosecutors argued that
"the robbery affected commerce by preventing [the victims] from reaching the store to make
their purchase of beer, an item that had traveled in interstate commerce." Id. at 911. The court
declined to extend jurisdiction. See id., infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
70. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-96 (1960) (discussing the difference
between conspiracy and the substantive offense); see also United States v. DiCarlantonio, 870
F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Brantley, 777 F.2d 159, 163 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Jarabek, 726 F.2d 889, 901 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d
578, 592 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc); United States v. Rindone, 631 F,2d 491, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992,
998 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665, 672 (2d Cir. 1955); Nick v. United
States, 122 F.2d 660, 673 (8th Cir. 1941).
71. 673 F.2d 578.
72. id. at 591.
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eral jurisdiction based on some anticipated effect on commerce. 73
In 1975, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the
conviction of a defendant charged only with extortion where the dis-
trict court found no actual effect on interstate commerce. The juris-
dictional predicate was satisfied solely on the "realistic probability" of
some future effect on interstate commerce. 74 The defendant in United
States v. Staszcuk,75 an alderman charged with three counts of extor-
tion, had accepted payments to permit zoning changes necessary for
the construction of a veterinary clinic. The payments were made and
the zoning changes were implemented, but for unspecified reasons the
veterinarian abandoned the project. 76 The developer subsequently er-
ected buildings that would have been permissible even absent the zon-
ing change.77 A panel of the appellate court conceded that the effect
of the extortive act on interstate commerce need not be simultaneous
with the act of extortion, but rejected the government's "frivolous"
contention that "any potential effect on commerce satisfies the Hobbs
Act."' 78 Citing United States v. DeMet,79 the court concluded that if
the charge of extortion as opposed to attempted extortion or conspir-
acy, were to be upheld, some actual effect on interstate commerce was
necessary: "If the extortion is successful and there is still no effect on
commerce, the extortioner has not violated the Hobbs Act."80
Rehearing the case en banc, the Court of Appeals rejected the
panel's reasoning and upheld the conviction. 81 Judge Stevens, writing
for the court, explained that the congressional intent in enacting the
73. See, e.g., United States v. Scacchetti, 668 F.2d 643, 648-49 (2d Cir. 1982) (approving jury
instruction based on the Nick language quoted supra at note 27); United States v. Pearson, 508
F.2d 595, 597 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding federal jurisdiction where defendants conspired to rob
the safety deposit boxes of a hotel that entertained large numbers of guests from out of state);
United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir. 1969) ("Interstate commerce was in-
volved and attempted interference, if not actual interference, was clearly established."); United
States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1967) (stating all that must be proved is that the
"natural effect" of the executed threat would be an effect on interstate commerce); Varlack, 225
F.2d at 672 (same); Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1954) (upholding fed-
eral jurisdiction where union official threatened labor disruptions if his extortive demand were
not met); Nick, 122 F.2d at 673; see also Expansion, supra note 14, at 316-17.
74. United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
75. 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974), affd in part on reh'g, rev'd in part on reh'g, 517 F.2d 53 (7th
Cir. 1975). Staszcuk was indicted on three counts of extortion under color of official right. See
id. at 877. The court's holding on the third count was the subject of the rehearing en banc. See
id.
76. See id. at 877-78.
77. See id. at 879.
78. Id. at 879; see id. n.10.
79. 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973).
80. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d at 878-79 & n.10.
81. See United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 56 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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statute "parallels the central purpose" of the Commerce Clause itself:
"to secure freedom of trade. '82 Because the Hobbs Act proscribes
extortion based on mere threats, without requiring that the threats be
executed, 83 the court concluded that jurisdiction could be sustained
based on the anticipated effect on commerce measured at the time of
the extortive agreement, whether or not the effect ever materialized. 84
The Staszcuk holding is frequently cited in Hobbs Act prosecu-
tions.85 Where this holding has been joined with the de minimis ef-
fects and depletion of assets theories, there have understandably been
very few successful jurisdictional challenges. 86
Establishing jurisdiction under the Act presents few difficulties in
modern prosecutions: the government can use the statute to bring
charges of extortion, robbery, or attempts or conspiracies to commit
such acts, then tailor its indictments to best fit the facts of its investiga-
82. Id. at 58.
83. See Id. at 57 & n.9, 59-60 & n.14.
84. The language of the Act states that "whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce" by extortive con-
duct or robbery is subject to the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994). The Staszcuk court para-
phrased the jurisdictional element and stated that the Act requires only that "the prosecutor
[must] prove some connection with interstate commerce in every case." Staszcuk, 517 F.2d at 59.
The two positions are not synonymous. The court conceded that if no effect on interstate com-
merce had been foreseeable on the date of the extortive transaction, federal jurisdiction could
not be supported. See id. at 59 n.19. This seems unlikely, however, given the courts' expansive
interpretation of the Act's "affects commerce" provision.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 396 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 642-43 (3d Cir. 1975); see also infra note 86
and cases cited therein.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Zeigler, 19
F.3d 486 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Harty, 930 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. McKenna, 889 F.2d 1168 (1st Cir. 1989);
United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358
(7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Tuchow, 768 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Jarabek,
726 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Boston, 718 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Glynn, 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157
(6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Harding,
563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977); Hathaway, 534 F.2d at 402; United States v. DiCaro, No. 88 Cr. 923,
1989 WL 18340 (N.D. I11. Feb. 24, 1989). But see United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95. 100 (5th
Cir. 1994) (finding effect on interstate commerce insufficiently drawn where the victim was a
private party whose work patterns were disrupted by the proscribed conduct); United States v.
Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402 (4th Cir. 1990) (involving private party whose personal indiscretions were
unrelated to interstate commerce); United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982) (find-
ing that extortion victim's only relation to interstate commerce was that he was employed by a
company doing business in interstate commerce); United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.
1978) (finding that extortion victims were in the process of liquidating their assets and going out
of business and were therefore not positioned to affect interstate commerce); United States v.
Blair, 762 F. Supp. 1384, 1393 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding that withdrawal of personal funds from
private bank account was insufficient to affect interstate commerce).
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tions without affecting the stringency of the sanction. 87 Similarly, the
government presumably maintains a high degree of control over the
development of its investigations, has available a wide variety of over-
lapping statutes proscribing related conduct,88 and brings to trial only
those cases in which the odds of prevailing are in its favor. Conse-
quently, when the government charged Judge Adam Stillo, Sr., and his
nephew Joseph with conspiracy to extort under color of official right,
all that was necessary to sustain federal intervention under the Hobbs
Act was a realistic probability that their victim's extortive payment
would affect his ability to purchase goods traveling in interstate com-
merce: a reduction in the victim's office supply funds would be
sufficient.
III. UNITED STATES V. STILLO
A. Factual Background
On November 5, 1986, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Adam
Stillo, Sr., considered the case of Illinois motorist James Hess. 89 A
state trooper had pulled Hess over for speeding and making an illegal
lane change. After discovering open beer cans and marijuana in the
car, the trooper arrested Hess.90 The defendant's attorney, Robert
Cooley, filed a motion to suppress evidence, but Judge Stillo denied
the motion and sentenced Hess to six months supervision. 91
That afternoon, Cooley visited Judge Stillo's nephew, attorney Jo-
seph Stillo, at Joseph's law offices.92 Cooley thought he had "fixed"
the case through Joseph Stillo to ensure suppression of the marijuana
and sought some explanation for the morning's events.93 Stillo re-
87. Defendants convicted under the Hobbs Act face imprisonment for up to twenty years
and fines of up to $10,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
88. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (stating that one who aids and abets may be treated as a
principal); 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-25 (1994) (describing bribery and graft involving federal officials);
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (involving conspiracy to commit offenses); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-94 (1994)
(involving extortionate credit practices); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1996) (involving extortion and rob-
bery); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1996) (involving interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprise); 18
U.S.C. § 1962 (1996) (finding federal racketeering charges predicated in part on state law bribery
and extortion).
89. See People v. James D. Hess, 03-5324571-75 (cited in United States v. Stillo, No. 91 CR
795-1-2, 1992 WL 297388 at *1 (N.D. I11. Oct. 7, 1992)).
90. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 555-56; Charles Nicodemus, Ex-Judge's Trial Begins Today: Stillo
Accused of Conspiring To Fix Case, Taking Bribes, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 6, 1993, at 12, available
in 1993 WL 6537284 [hereinafter Taking Bribes].
91. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 556.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 555-56. This was not the first illegal encounter between Cooley and Judge
Stillo. Between 1977 and 1983, Cooley had allegedly bribed the judge in several other cases, but
ceased when word surfaced of an ongoing federal investigation into local corruption. See id.;
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sponded that his uncle had convicted Hess because the defendant
"look[ed] like an FBI agent."'94 Two days later, Cooley spoke with the
Judge about the case. Judge Stillo informed Cooley that his client
"didn't sound right.... He sounded like a plant. I just started having
bad vibes out there. '95 On December 16, Cooley again spoke with
Joseph Stillo, who advised Cooley to persevere in his efforts on the
Hess case because his uncle would eventually be willing to expunge
the conviction from Hess' record.
96
Unfortunately for the Stillos, Cooley had been wearing a hidden
microphone throughout this period; Hess was an F.B.I. "plant;" and
the charges against him were fictional, filed by the United States At-
torney's Office and the FBI as part of an ongoing federal investigation
into corruption in Cook County.97 On October 2, 1991, Judge Stillo
was charged with racketeering, conspiracy to extort and attempted ex-
tortion. 98 Count I, section 4, charged in part:
Beginning in or about August 1986, and continuing to in or
about April 1987, defendant Adam Stillo, Sr. did conspire with Jo-
seph T. Stillo to commit extortion, in that defendant Adam Stillo,
Sr. agreed with Joseph T. Stillo to obtain money from Robert J.
Cooley, in order to corruptly provide a favorable resolution to the
client of Robert J. Cooley in the case of People of the State of Illi-
Matt O'Connor, Stillo Found Guilty of Corruption, CHI. TRIB., July 30, 1993, at Al, available in
1993 WL 11089377. The Hess trial was originally set to come before Judge Stillo on October 21,
1986, but at the last minute, the trial was postponed. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 556. People v. Hess
went to trial a day after the Illinois election in which Judge Lawrence A. Passarella was defeated
in his bid for judicial retention. Eight months earlier, Judge Passarella had acquitted a local
bodybuilder accused in a 1984 beating of a Chicago policewoman. See id. The acquittal resulted
in widespread popular outrage. Charles Nicodemus, '86 Colella Case Cited In Trial of Judge
Stillo, July 14, 1993, CHI. SuN-TIMES, at 22, available in 1993 WL 6538534. A separate federal
investigation into alleged political corruption in the First Ward turned up allegations that the
Colella trial had been fixed by the late Pat Marcy, First Ward Democratic Organization secre-
tary: Robert Cooley had been Colella's lawyer. See id.
94. Matt O'Connor, Judge's Sixth Sense Recounted at Bribe Trial, CHI. TRIB., July 9, 1993, at
Al, available in 1993 WL 11082705; Stillo, 57 F.3d at 556; see also Appellate Brief for Joseph
Stillo, Stillo 57 F.3d 553 (No. 94-2679) [hereinafter J. Stillo Br.]. As attorneys for Joseph Stillo
recounted the story:
Later that day, Cooley went to Joe Stillo's office. Cooley told Joe that he thought the
state trooper "tried to bang me. I think he manufactured a story." Joe interjected,
"That's not why he did it," and explained that the judge thought Cooley's client looked
like an FBI agent. Cooley and [Joseph] Stillo discussed what FBI agents looked like,
with Joe noting that an "agent looks different to everyone depending on their level of
paranoia at any given moment."
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
95. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 556.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 555; Nicodemus, Taking Bribes, supra note 90, at 12; Charles Nicodemus, Stillo
Convicted In Bribery Case: Retired Judge's Nephew Also Found Guilty, in CHI. SUN-TIMES, July
30, 1993, at 3, available in 1993 WL 6541261.
98. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 556-57. Judge Stillo was also charged with violations of Illinois law
prohibiting official misconduct, conspiracy, and bribery. See supra note 1.
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nois v. James D. Hess, 03-5324571-75; in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1951. 99
Count II charged Judge Stillo and his nephew with conspiracy to
extort, "in that they agreed among themselves to obtain an amount of
money from Robert J. Cooley, with his consent, said consent being
induced under color of official right .... It was further a part of the
conspiracy .. . to obtain a favorable resolution of the case against
Cooley's client .... 0
On July 29, 1993, a jury found Judge Stillo guilty of racketeering
and conspiracy to commit extortion. He was subsequently sentenced
to four years' imprisonment. 10 1 Joseph Stillo was found guilty of con-
spiracy to commit extortion, and was sentenced to two years' impris-
onment and a $10,000 fine.
102
B. Upholding Federal Jurisdiction in United States v. Stillo
On appeal, the Stillos attacked the jurisdictional link between the
extortive transaction and the purchase of goods traveling in interstate
commerce.' 0 3 They argued that the government had failed to show
that Cooley's specific contributions were used to purchase such
goods.1 n They also argued that Cooley's comment-that Hess him-
self would be paying Judge Stillo's bribe-demonstrated that Cooley's
assets were not implicated in the scheme. 10 5 Similarly, they asserted
that the government's depletion of assets theory was inapposite be-
cause the bribery money was supplied by the FBI rather than by Coo-
ley's firm. Thus, there could be no effect on interstate commerce that
was not attributable to the undercover operation. 10 6 Finally, the Stil-
los questioned the sufficiency of the interstate nexus in light of the
Supreme Court's recent holding in United States v. Lopez.10 7
To establish the connection between the Stillos' extortive scheme
and interstate commerce, the government presented "numerous"
99. Indictment, supra note 1, at Count I, 1 2(d)(4).
100. Id. at Count II, 11 2, 7.
101. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 556; Matt O'Connor, Judge Stillo Gets 4 Years for Fixing String of
Cases, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 1994, at A3, available in 1994 WL 6505720. The government sought a
ten-year sentence and argued that the elder Stillo was in "excellent shape." Id. The trial judge
replied, "I'm dealing with a 77-year old man," and sentenced Judge Stillo to four years' impris-
onment. Id.
102. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 556.
103. See id. at 558.
104. See id. at 559.
105. See id. at 558-59.
106. See id. at 559. This argument was apparently first addressed in the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Glynn, 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980).
107. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see infra notes 127-29, 218-20, 222-58 and accompanying text.
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items purchased by Cooley's law firm that had traveled in interstate
commerce, such as will covers and "an $11.75 Texas Instruments mini-
desk calculator" shipped from Texas. 10 8 An office employee engaged
by Cooley's firm also testified that Cooley made "weekly contribu-
tions" to the common office account, out of which such goods were
regularly purchased. 10 9 The government built its case on a number of
settled propositions: (1) no actual effect on interstate commerce need
be found if the "natural effect" of the scheme, upon execution, were
to obstruct commerce;110 (2) an effect on interstate commerce need
only be de minimis;i1 (3) a reduction, however temporary, of the vic-
tim's ability to purchase goods that have traveled in interstate com-
merce is sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction;11 2 and (4) the
assets depleted must be those of an enterprise or organization regu-
larly engaged in activities with an interstate nexus.
113
The Court of Appeals concluded that "the general set-up was suf-
ficient to support the jury's finding" that the payment of a bribe by
Cooley could potentially deplete his firm's assets.114 In particular, the
Stillo court relied on three prior Seventh Circuit decisions: United
States v. Murphy, 15 United States v. Lewis,116 and United States v.
108. J. Stillo Br., supra note 94, at 16; see also Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558. On appeal, Joseph Stillo
noted:
As part of the interstate commerce evidence, the government offered a series of bills.
One such bill showed that [the firm of] Lemke & Cooley ordered an $11.75 Texas
Instruments mini-desk calculator from Quill corporation [sic]. On August 28, 1986,
Quill shipped the calculator form Texas to Chicago. [An employee] testified that this
calculator was ordered by a person named Donna, and [the employee] did not know
who the calculator was for....
The next bill was for a [sic] $188.40 worth of will covers and will envelopes pro-
vided by Histacount, a New York corporation. The will materials were paid for on
November 24, 1986....
J. Stillo Br., supra note 94, at 16-17. The government also introduced Illinois Bell telephone
bills, "most" of which were for intrastate calls; and "long distance telephone bills for which
payments were made in September, October, and November 1986." Id. at 17; see also Appellate
Brief for Adam Stillo, at 9 n.2, Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (No. 94-2678) [hereinafter A. Stillo Br.]
109. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 56 n.6, 60 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc);
Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660, 673 (8th Cir. 1941).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Auguello, 451 F.2d 1167, 1169-70 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076
(2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Malinsky, 19 F.R.D. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090, 1098 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Boston, 718 F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 822 (7th Cir.
1973); United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Provenzano, 334
F.2d 678, 693 (3d Cir. 1964).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402, 1404-07 (4th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1024
(8th Cir. 1978): United States v. Merolla, 523 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1975).
114. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558.
115. 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Shields.117 Two of the cases, Murphy and Shields, involved prosecu-
tions in which the "victims" had been attorneys working with the FBI
to ferret out corrupt judges. 118 The Stillo court thus expressed no hes-
itation in sustaining jurisdiction based on the de minimis depletion of
an attorney's office supply funds. 119
The court likewise dismissed the Stillos' claim that the use of FBI
funds in the operation negated any possible effect on interstate com-
merce.120 The Stillo court referred to Shields,12' a holding which in
turn had relied on United States v. Hocking,122 in which the court con-
cluded that the offense of attempted extortion "is complete at the
time the attempt to extract payment is made, even before any money
changes hands."'1 23 Because the Stillos were charged as conspirators,
and because the intended victim was attorney Cooley ("in his profes-
116. 797 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1986).
117. 999 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1993).
118. United States v. Murphy involved two attorneys who had bribed a Cook County Circuit
Court judge for favorable rulings. See 768 F.2d at 1526, 1530. One, an undercover FBI agent
posing as a corrupt attorney, had regularly purchased stationery from New York. See id. The
other, who had agreed to cooperate with the government in the investigation, purchased law
books from outside Illinois. See id. The confidential informant in United States v. Shields was
Robert Cooley. See 999 F.2d at 1093.
119. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558.
120. See id.; see also United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 783 (7th Cir. 1979). But see
United States v. Brantley, 777 F.2d 159, 163 (4th Cir. 1985) (concluding that interstate movement
of FBI gambling equipment and undercover personnel did not satisfy the interstate commerce
element of extortion under the Hobbs Act: "We do not think the commercial predicate for fed-
eral jurisdiction can be found in such pretense on the part of federal agents."). See infra notes
171-97 and accompanying text.
121. 999 F.3d at 1097-99.
122. 860 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1988).
123. Id. at 777; see also United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1978) (involving
extortive scheme to insure award of city contracts based on a fee of 10% of all future contracts
and a $3,000 "initiation fee"). Santoni involved an FBI shell-corporation established for the
"specific purpose" of obtaining evidence of corruption in the awarding of city contracts. Id. at
670. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the FBI-sponsored company
was a functional business engaged in ongoing operations. See id.; see also United States v.
Brooklier, 459 F. Supp. 476, 479 (C.D. Cal. 1978) ("Legal impossibility is said to exist whenever
the intended acts, even if successfully completed by a defendant, would not constitute a
crime.... Factual impossibility... refers to those situations in which a circumstance unknown to
the defendant renders the consummation of the intended criminal conduct physically impossible.
[W]hile legal impossibility is a defense to a charge of attempt, factual impossibility is not.");
United States v. Bellomini, 454 F. Supp. 44, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("The fact that the business
enterprise was frustrated at a later time through failure of finances does not constitute a defense
to a charge of attempt to extort money in violation of the Hobbs Act."); cf. Blakey, 607 F.2d at
782-84. Blakey raised the question of whether the Hobbs Act would extend to extortion of
illegal businesses. See id. at 783. In that case, the extortion victim had used a tire store as a
cover for the sale of heroin. The court cited Santoni for the proposition that an F.B.I. "dummy"
corporation could be used successfully to ferret out official corruption. See id. The Blakey court
determined "[o]n the basis of these authorities" that the Hobbs Act's coverage extended to
"mixed legal-illegal business ventures like [that run by the victim]." Id.
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sional capacity"), 124 the crime was complete before the source of Coo-
ley's payment money-motorist Hess or the FBI-became an issue. 125
The Stillo court thus upheld jurisdiction based on the probable effect
on interstate commerce at the time of the proscribed agreement. 26
Finally, the court dismissed the Stillos' reliance on United States v.
Lopez as misplaced, noting that unlike the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, which the Lopez Court ruled unconstitutional, 127 the
Hobbs Act contained both an express jurisdictional provision and was
directed at a "type of economic activity. 112 8 The Stillo court con-
cluded that Lopez had done "nothing to undermine this [c]ourt's
precedents that minimal potential effect on commerce is all that need
be proven to support a conviction. '1
29
C. Analysis of the Court's Holding in United States v. Stillo
1. De Minimis Depletion of the Victim's Assets
Each circuit has developed its own body of Hobbs Act case law
but all rely on common principles, including the de minimis effects'
30
124. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 560; see also Indictment supra note 1, at 8 ("Defendant Adam Stillo,
Sr., would corruptly rule in a manner favorable to the client of Robert J. Cooley.").
125. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558-59.
126. The Stillo c urt continued, "[L]ater developments which negate or lower the potential
effect on interstate commerce do not undermine the jurisdictional element." Id. at 558 (citing
United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc)). See also United States v.
Glynn, 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980) (concerning FBI funding of an undercover operation involv-
ing payoffs to city electrical inspectors). In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge Swygert argued:
[A]ny attempt to affect commerce was an impossibility when the monies offered and
delivered to the defendant were Government funds rather than assets of the contrac-
tors. Conceptually, the transactions were illusory insofar as their having any possibility,
let alone probability, of an effect on commerce. There was no possible risk that the
contractors' assets might be depleted.
... Here an effect, actual or potential, on interstate commerce (a necessary juris-
dictional element of a Hobbs Act prosecution) did not exist nor could it have come into
existence.
... The statute does not cover "attempts" to affect commerce; it speaks only of
attempts to rob or extort.
Id. at 44. The court in United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1980), which three
days later handed down a decision in accord with the Glynn decision, found Judge Swygert's
argument persuasive. Indeed, Judge Swygert eventually capitulated to the "the law of the cir-
cuit" in United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 1973) (Swygert, J., concurring).
127. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702(a), 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921, 924 (1994)). See infra notes 217-20, 222-58 and accompanying text.
128. StiUo, 57 F.3d at 558 n.2; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557-560 (1995).
129. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558 n.2.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1067 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding no more
than a minimal effect on commerce need be shown where defendants engaged in extortive
scheme to sell job opportunities at $500-$1000 per job); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639,
642-43 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding de minimis effect on interstate commerce sufficient where senator
extorted payments totaling $20,000 from victim); United States v. Shackelford, 494 F.2d 67, 75
(9th Cir. 1974) (noting that the effect on interstate commerce need only be minimal where de-
fendant attempted to extort $270,000 from an airline); United States v. Bryson, 418 F. Supp. 818,
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
and depletion of assets theories, 131 as well as the requirement that the
government need demonstrate only a reasonable probability that the
proscribed conduct will affect interstate commerce. 132 The Act has
been broadly read in all circuits;133 prosecutions in the Seventh Cir-
cuit, however, far more frequently than elsewhere, have been upheld
based on truly de minimis depletions of assets. 134 Many of the Sev-
enth Circuit cases employing this analysis-including United States v.
Murphy,135 United States v. Shields,136 and United States v. Still
1 3 7 -
are the result of widespread investigations into patterns of official cor-
ruption.' 38 Thus, a defendant convicted on a single count representing
a $100 transaction may nevertheless have been charged with (and
brought to trial on) multiple counts alleging a long series of corrupt or
extortive activity.
Following their convictions, the Stillos filed post-trial motions
challenging the sufficiency of the interstate nexus between Cooley, his
825 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (holding extortion of $10,000 and attempted extortion of $8000 was suffi-
cient to affect interstate commerce where effect need only be de minimis by most standards); see
also infra note 158 and cases cited therein.
131. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
132. When traced back in each jurisdiction, courts generally cite United States v. Staszcuk,
517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc) as the source for this proposition. See, e.g., University v.
Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 373 (8th Cir.
1976); Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 643. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained
in United States v. Auguello that "it is enough that the extortion 'in any way or degree' affects
commerce, though its effects be merely potential or subtle." 451 F.2d 1167, 1169 (2d Cir. 1971).
See supra notes 56-59, 73-84 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960); United States v. Peete, 919
F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 590 (3d Cir. 1982) (en
banc); Staszcuk, 517 F.2d at 58 (en banc); Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 642; United States v. DeMet, 486
F.2d 816, 821-22 (7th Cir. 1973).
134. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 60, 130, infra note 157.
135. 999 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1985).
136. 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
137. 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995).
138. See cases cited supra note 60. The Stillo case is one of a lengthening series of prosecu-
tions stemming from federal investigation into political and judicial corruption in Cook County.
See, e.g., JAMES TUOHY & ROBERT WARDEN, GREYLORD: JUSTICE CHICAGO STYLE (1989); Matt
O'Connor, 20th Judge Charged with Corruption: Stillo Latest in Long Line U.S. Targeted, CHI.
TRIE., Oct. 3, 1991, at Al; Charles Mound et al, U.S. Seeks Trial Records of 7 County Judges,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1989, at Al. The O'Connor article lists the following record of indictments
and convictions for judicial corruption in the Seventh Circuit:
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client and the defendants' extortive conduct.1 39 The trial court sug-
gested that the time spent by Cooley and the use of his firm's equip-
ment and personnel in preparing the Hess case might serve to satisfy
the otherwise modest burden of proving the connection to interstate
commerce:1
40
Cooley filed, as part of his representation of Hess, written docu-
ments which were prepared by firm secretarial staff on firm paper
using firm equipment, such as typewriters and duplicating equip-
ment. He also used firm telephones. In addition, he spent time on
the Hess case, [sic] all of these activities have financial implications
for his law firm which would deplete its assets.
141
It is true that, broadly defined, an organization's secretarial staff,
firm paper, office equipment and billable hours are business "assets."







































Convicted: 6 years, $50,000 fine
Convicted: 13 years
Convicted: 12 years
Indicted on racketeering charges
Convicted: 11 years
Convicted: 6 years
Pled Guilty: 3 years, $15,000 fine
Convicted: 10 years
Convicted: 6 years
Pled Guilty: 12 years, $35,000 fine
Convicted: 10 years, $33,000 fine
Pled Guilty: 9 years, $10,000 fine
Pled Guilty: 4 years
Convicted: faces senetncing
Indicted on Racketeering Charges
Pled Guilty: 8 years
* 1st Municipal District, formerly supervising judge of Traffic Court.
tChancery Court. Shields was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment and three years
supervised release. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
$Judge Maloney was convicted of bribery on April 17, 1993. He was sentenced to fifteen
years and nine months' imprisonment, and fined $200,000 for his role in fixing three murder
trials in the 1980s. See United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995); Matt
O'Connor, Ex-Judge Gets Final Fix: 15 Years, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 1994, at Al.
139. See United States v. Stillo, No. 91 CR 795-1-2, 1993 WL 565988, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26,
1994).
140. See id. It is unclear whether the government or the trial judge was the author of this
theory. The government's appellate brief seems to lay authorship on the trial court:
[A]s the district court noted in denying a post-trial motion to set aside the ver-
dict,... Cooley "[used firm supplies and] spent time on the Hess case, [and] all of these
activities have financial implications for the law firm which would deplete its assets."
Thus, the jury could reasonably conclude that Cooley's payment of a bribe to Adam
Stillo would diminish the firm's "potential as a purchaser of [interstate] goods."
Direct Appeal Brief for Government, at 31, United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (No. 94-2679)
(quoting Stillo, 1993 WL 565988 at *1; United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir.
1978)). [hereinafter Govt. Br.]
141. Stillo, 1993 WL 565988 at *1.
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have been direct pecuniary outlays: the authority cited in the govern-
ment's briefs and the court's opinion certainly does not suggest an
expansion of the definition of the term "assets" to include services,
non-pecuniary assets, or business equipment depreciation. 142 Neither
is it clear how the court's post hoc jurisdictional analysis ensures that
the jurisdictional predicate could be satisfied before federal power is
exercised. As the Supreme Court has explained elsewhere:
Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only
the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and
the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto .... [When the
lower federal court] lack[s] jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on ap-
peal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the
error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.
143
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the general
set-up was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the payment of
a bribe by Cooley could potentially deplete the assets with which the
firm purchased goods and services in interstate commerce.'
44
Whether or not Stillo was intended to represent first authority for the
proposition that jurisdiction may be sustained by the "depletion" of
the billable hours, locally-provided support services or nonpecuniary
assets of the victim enterprise, this is precisely the sort of passing com-
ment that, quoted in a parenthetical or jury instruction, has served in
the past to extend federal jurisdiction under the Act.
145
142. The government cited the following cases in support of its jurisdictional argument:
United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.
DeParias, 805 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455 (7th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d
1020 (7th Cir. 1978).
One case cited by the government, United States v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486 (10th Cir. 1994),
contained the following passage:
Mr. Zeigler was charged in count six with taking $1500 from Rex's Fried Chicken Res-
taurant, a business that purchases all of its chicken and breading formula, as well as
numerous other products, directly from out-of-state suppliers. The owner testified that
the monies taken would have been used to purchase more interstate goods and to pay
employees, rent, utilities, and taxes.
Id. at 492 (cited in Govt. Br., supra note 140, at 29). The government's parenthetical accompa-
nying the citation explained that a "reduction of money with which to pay utility bills, inter alia,
supplied sufficient impact on interstate commerce." (Govt. Br., supra note 140, at 29.) This
passage and this parenthetical represent very thin support for the proposition that a depletion of
services is sufficient to invoke federal protection.
143. Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (citations and
footnotes omitted); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960), supra notes 35-39
and accompanying text.
144. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558.
145. See supra notes 27, 34, 44-52 and accompanying text.
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An issue unaddressed in the Stillo opinion but argued in the ap-
pellate briefs concerns the calibration of probability in the absence of
an actual effect on interstate commerce. In its charge to the jury, the
district court stated, "The law does not require an actual effect. In this
case you must simply determine whether the alleged extortionate
transaction, if completed, had the potential to affect commerce, how-
ever minimally. ' 146 The defendants had objected on various grounds
to the instruction. 147 Judge Stillo had argued that "[t]he correct test to
be applied, in the absence of evidence of an actual impact on inter-
state commerce, is whether there is a 'realistic probability' of an effect
on commerce." This standard, he continued, "is clearly more difficult
to prove than the mere potential to affect commerce, however mini-
mally. ' 148 The government responded that the Court of Appeals had
previously approved of the phrase "'potential' effect upon interstate
commerce" in sustaining jurisdiction.1 49 Though the Court of Appeals
declined to address Judge Stillo's argument, it had previously
146. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 559-60 (emphasis added). The defendants' proffered instruction read:
The interstate commerce element of affecting commerce by extortion is satisfied if the
government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert Cooley made monetary
contributions to his law office around the time of the alleged conspiracy, and his law
office used such contributions to purchase goods that originated from outside the state
of Illinois.
The jury instruction used by the court read:
The interstate commerce element of the offense of affecting commerce by extortion if
the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the law office of Robert J.
Cooley customarily purchased goods that originated from outside the state of Illinois
such as materials necessary for the function of his law office.
The law does not require an actual effect. In this case you must simply determine
whether the alleged extortionate transaction, if completed, had the potential to affect
commerce, however minimally.
Id.; see United States v. Summers, 598 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing the role of the courts
and the jury in determining whether interstate commerce was affected) (citing cases).
147. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 559-60. Joseph Stillo argued that the instructions required neither
that the jury find that Cooley had actually contributed to his firm's office supply fund, nor that
the government prove that purchases of goods traveling in interstate commerce were made at
the time of the alleged extortive acts. Id. at 559. The court responded that this was "more than
is required" by the case law in the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 559.
148. A. Stillo Br., supra note 108, at 14 (quoting United States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090 (7th
Cir. 1993)). But see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
149. Govt. Br., supra note 140, at 38 n.26. The passage on which the government relied in
United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1994), provides uncertain support for the gov-
ernment's position: "Because the Hobbs Act has been interpreted to reach the outer limit of the
Commerce Clause, evidence indicating Defendants' conduct had a realistic probability, or 'po-
tential,' of affecting interstate commerce, even if no actual effect occurred, is sufficient to sup-
port their conviction." Morgano, 39 F.3d at 1370 (quoting United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d
1155, 1164 (7th Cir. 1990)). Morgano involved the extortionate collection of "street tax" and
protection money from the operators of illegal and quasi-legal gambling enterprises: fifteen per-
cent of the gross proceeds from an illegal lottery, and approximately $10,000 per month in pro-
tection payments from various operators. See id. at 1363-64.
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explained, 150
For Hobbs Act jurisdiction to exist, there must be a 'nexus' between
the alleged extortionate conduct and interstate commerce. This
nexus may be established by proof of an actual impact on com-
merce, even if the impact is only 'arguably de minimis,' or, in the
absence of proof of an actual impact, by 'showing a realistic
probability that . . . [the] extortionate transaction will have some
effect on interstate commerce.'1 51
The judge was thus correct, yet the Court of Appeals' alternating us-
age suggests that the "potential effects" and "reasonable probability"
standards are synonymous. Whether or not the difference constitutes
reversible error, failure by the courts to insist on or adhere to such
fine distinctions-indeed, their distinctions-is yet another means by
which the courts have gradually extended federal jurisdiction.
It is not immediately clear from the court's opinion that the
amount of money Stillo was to receive in return for the Hess ruling
was ever finalized. 52 The previous system between the Judge and
Cooley involved payments of $10005200 dollars for fixing misdemean-
ors and $1,000-$2,000 for felonies. After setting out the prior fee
schedule, the Court of Appeals summarized Cooley's approach to the
judge: "[He] inquired of Judge Stillo if he was still accepting bribes
for favorable rulings. The judge said yes and that the system was the
same as before.' 53 During a later luncheon at which Cooley dis-
closed the "facts" of Hess' case to Joseph, however, he suggested,
"You tell me what's fair and we'll take care of it then," that is, follow-
ing the disposition of the case. 154 As Joseph Stillo later argued-an
argument undisputed by the government-"At no time during the al-
leged conspiracy did any person set a specific dollar amount to control
the result in Hess. At no time during the controversy did Cooley pay
anybody in reference to Hess. At no time did Stillo or Adam Stillo
ask Cooley for money."'1 55 Federal jurisdiction was thus established
on the basis of a potential depletion of the attorney Cooley's assets (if
150. See United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979).
151. Id. at 783 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 60
(7th Cir. 1975) (en banc); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992, 997 (7th
Cir. 1974)); see also Govt. Br., supra note 140, at 29, 39-40.
152. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 555-56, 558-59.
153. Id. at 555; see also id. at 559.
154. Id. at 559; see J. Stillo Br., supra note 94, at 8-9; Govt. Br., supra note 140, at 35.
155. J. Stillo Br., supra note 94, at 15, 49. Judge Stillo further argued, "The infrequent
purchase of a handful of items . . . do[es] not constitute customary or active engagement in
interstate commerce sufficient to bring Defendant's conduct within the jurisdiction of this
Court." Reply Brief for Adam Stillo, at 4-5, Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (No. 94-2678). As the govern-
ment pointed out, however, "[A] business owner presumptively contributes to that business."
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Hess refused to pay), stemming from an agreement for an unspecified
future payment that was never made, based on a transaction that was
never completed, for a sum that was never settled. While the courts
have never insisted on an actual effect on interstate commerce in or-
der to sustain jurisdiction where conspiracy is charged, 156 United States
v. Stillo illustrates the extent to which the jurisdictional element of the
Act has been eased over the past fifty years.
Although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on
United States v. Murphy in affirming the convictions in Shields and
Stillo, other courts have viewed the holding cautiously on the subject
of federal jurisdiction. 157 In part, this lack of acceptance may indi-
rectly reflect decisions in other districts by United States Attorneys
regarding the types of cases they are willing to prosecute. 158 In part, it
Govt. Br., supra note 139, at 39 (citing United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 1979);
United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1986)).
156. See supra notes 28-33, 70-86 and accompanying text.
157. Outside the Seventh Circuit, only two courts of appeal have relied on United States v.
Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th. Cir. 1985) in discussions regarding the depletion of assets theory
and federal jurisdiction: United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 1994), and Jund v. Town of
Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1991). Collins involved the theft of a salesman's personal
vehicle and mobile telephone, the result of which was an inability by the victim to attend busi-
ness meetings or make business-related telephone calls. 40 F.3d at 99. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the linkage to interstate commerce was "too attenuated" to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of the Hobbs Act. See id. at 100. Jund v. Town of Hempstead in-
volved a class action suit brought by a sanitation worker against a township and a county polit-
ical committee. 941 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1991). He alleged RICO and Section 1983 violations
based on coercive political contributions. See id. at 1285. In affirming the decision that unincor-
porated political associations were capable of committing the predicate Hobbs Act violations,
the Court of Appeals noted that the aggregate effect of all those whose contributions were ex-
torted was sufficient to affect interstate commerce: "[Wihile the impact from any single person
was undoubtedly slight, the cumulative effect on interstate commerce from all those victimized
by the scheme could have been very substantial. In any event the degree of the effect on inter-
state commerce is immaterial because the Hobbs Act prohibits any interference with commerce
through extortion." Id.; see also Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal I & II,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 743 & n.344 (1987) ("The interstate commerce requirement is not a
substantial obstacle. The courts have unanimously held that even if the [RICO] predicate acts
do not affect commerce, federal jurisdiction exists if the enterprise does.") (citing Murphy, 768
F.2d at 1531)).
158. Conversely, of course, the willingness of a United States Attorney to prosecute certain
cases, including those based on a de minimis depletion of the victim's assets, may reflect a sensi-
tivity to the enthusiasm within that judicial circuit for sustaining federal jurisdiction on such an
attenuated basis. This is not to say that a de minimis effect on interstate commerce has not been
found sufficient to sustain jurisdiction in other circuits. See e.g., United States v. Bailey, 990 F.2d
119, 121-22 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding jurisdiction based in part on three extorted campaign
contributions of $200, $450, and $500); United States v. Stephens, 964 F.2d 424, 432 n.16 (5th Cir.
1992) (involving extortion by bail bondsman of $10-$15 per car from a towing company and
payments of between $500 and $1040 from motorists); United States v. Sorrow, 732 F.2d 176, 179
(11th Cir. 1984) (involving extortive kickback of $1000 per purchase approval for various pieces
of earth moving equipment); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1977) (involv-
ing sale of state licensing exam questions and answers for $300); United States v. Spagnolo, 546
F.2d 1117, 1118 (4th Cir. 1976) (involving $1500 payment and $1 for the sale of victim's half
interest in a construction company); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 390 (1st Cir. 1976)
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may also reflect the fact that Murphy represents, by any standards, a
very hesitant endorsement of the notion that jurisdiction can be main-
tained based on a de minimis depletion of the victim's assets. The
Murphy court noted, "The evidence is thin, and as an original matter
we might be inclined to doubt that the 'depletion' of the lawyers' as-
sets had much effect on commerce."' 59 Feeling itself bound, however,
by decisions such as United States v. Staszcuk,160 the court concluded
that "even a small effect touches commerce 'in any degree' and so is
adequate under these cases.' 61 Neither the Shields nor the Stillo
courts subsequently expressed the ambivalence voiced in Murphy
over questions of federal intervention.
162
Stillo, Shields, Murphy and United States v. Boulahanis163 in the
Seventh Circuit; and United States v. Auguello' 64 and United States v.
Barrett165 in the Second Circuit fairly demonstrate the present juris-
dictional reach of the Hobbs Act. Cases such as United States v.
Dean,166 and United States v. Quigley167 in the Eighth Circuit suggest
that the robbery prong of the Act has likewise been broadly inter-
preted.168 Quigley, for instance, involved the robbery and beating of
two rural Nebraskans on their way to a liquor store; the defendants
(involving approximately $25,000); United States v. Auguello, 451 F.2d 1167, 1168-69 (2d Cir.
1971) (involving $100 payment made from the business cash register); Esperti v. United States,
406 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1969) (involving robbery of $2000); United States v. Provenzano, 334
F.2d 678, 683 (3d Cir. 1964) (involving monthly payments of $200 made over a period of seven
years); United States v. Barrett, No. 85 Cr. 472 (JFK), 1985 WL 2344 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1985)
(involving extortion of $200 for release of impounded motor vehicle without payment of prior
fines and penalties). But see supra notes 60 and 130 and accompanying text.
159. Murphy, 768 F.2d at 1530.
160. 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc); see supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text
(discussing Staszcuk holdings).
161. Murphy, 768 F.2d at 1531 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1996)).
162. See United States v. Stillo, 53 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Shields, 999 F.2d 1090, 1098 (7th Cir. 1993).
163. 677 F.2d 586, 589-90 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding jurisdiction based on a $68 depletion of
assets).
164. 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971).
165. No. 85 Cr. 472 (JFK), 1985 WL 2344 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1985) (involving extortion of
$200 for release of impounded motor vehicle without payment of prior fines and penalties). The
court noted that the indictment alleged that the defendant had solicited and accepted at least
one such payment, and concluded, "Through such a payment, however, the City of New York
was deprived of towing fees, storage fees, fines and penalties owed by the owner. . . . [The
defendant's] alleged intentional deprivation of money owed to the City of New York depleted
the assets of a municipality engaged in interstate commerce." Id. at *2.
166. 32 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding federal jurisdiction where defendants abducted
and brutalized a private citizen, stole her credit cards, attempted unsuccessfully to force her to
reveal her personal identification number for her bank card, and then destroyed her vehicle).
167. 53 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 1995). The victims were on their way to a liquor store to pick up
goods they had charged on a house account over the telephone. The court explained that the
transaction had been completed over the telephone before the robbery transpired. See id.
168. See infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
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obtained only eighty cents and a small pouch of chewing tobacco.
169
Prosecutors attempted to establish jurisdiction by arguing that rob-
bery of the patrons of businesses affected commerce "in any way or
degree" by limiting or preventing the purchase of liquor that had trav-
eled in interstate commerce. 170 The court rejected the government's
argument as overreaching the present limits of the law, noting that the
prosecutors' efforts to link private activities to interstate commerce
were too tenuously drawn to warrant federal protection. Neverthe-
less, it is not at all clear from the opinion that the court would have
reached the same conclusion had the defendants robbed the liquor
store of eighty cents.
2. Use of the Depletion of Assets Theory Where the Money Is
Provided by the FBI.
The Stillos argued that because Cooley was using funds supplied
by the FBI his firm's assets would not be depleted.171 The Court of
Appeals replied that the source of potential bribe money was "irrele-
vant:' 72 "'the Hobbs Act proscribes not just successful extortion
schemes but attempts to induce a victim engaged in interstate com-
merce to part with property' and the intended victim was Cooley, not
the FBI."'1 73
The position that the source of potential bribe money was "irrele-
vant" is not entirely accurate, since Hobbs Act convictions have occa-
sionally been reversed because of FBI involvement.' 74 In United
States v. DiCarlantonio,175 for example, two city officers sought a fee
from a local businessman to lobby for changes in a safety ordinance. 1
76
169. See Quigley, 53 F.3d at 910.
170. Id. at 910-11.
171. See United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 1995).
172. Id. at 557-59 (citing United States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1993)).
173. Id. at 559 (quoting Shields, 999 F.2d at 1098); see also United States v. Rindone, 631
F.2d 491, 493 (7th Cir. 1980).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Freedman, 562 F. Supp. 1378, 1383 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding
that while an attempt to extort is punishable under the Hobbs Act, "no actual commission of
Hobbs Act extortion could be charged for the [mere] receipt of what were FBI funds" unless an
actual effect on interstate commerce could be shown); cf. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670,
682 (2d Cir. 1973). The extortion convictions in Archer were overturned because "the federal
officers themselves supplied the interstate element and acted to ensure that an interstate ele-
ment would be present." See id. The case involved federal convictions for bribery under the
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994). See id.
175. 870 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1989).
176. See id. at 1059-60. The fire chief and the city attorney had approached the owner of a
propane company to propose what they promised would be a lucrative business deal. For
$30,000 in cash, defendants offered to lobby for changes in the city's gas storage regulations. See
id. Had defendants' efforts succeeded, the result would have presumably been an increase in the
amount of propane and gas storage equipment traveling in interstate commerce. See id.
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The victim immediately contacted the FBI, which provided the
$30,000 demanded by the defendants. Because the defendants' lobby-
ing efforts proved unsuccessful, the law remained unchanged and the
overall flow of goods in interstate commerce remained unaffected. 17
7
The city officers in DiCarlantonio had been convicted on charges
of extortion and conspiracy to extort, but on appeal, the convictions
for extortion were reversed. 178 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit concluded that an extorionate scheme must have "at least a de
minimis effect" on interstate commerce to qualify as a substantive
charge of extortion. 179 The DiCarlantonio court referred to a widely-
cited case, United States v. Rindone,180 in which the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that payments made
with money supplied by the FBI necessarily thwarted jurisdiction.' 8'
Neither the DiCarlantonio nor the Rindone courts perceived jurisdic-
tional problems based on attempted extortion where the funds used
were supplied by the FBI. Both courts agreed that "the fortuitous use
of FBI funds after completion of the extortion attempt" had no impact
on the jurisdictional analysis. 182 The Courts of Appeal for the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits likewise agreed that an actual effect on interstate
commerce could not, however, be established based on "the mere re-
177. See id. at 1060.
178. See id. at 1060-61.
179. Id. (citing United States v. Fraasch, 818 F.2d 631, 634-35 (7th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Brantley, 777 F.2d 159, 161-63 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 491
(7th Cir. 1980); Freedman, 562 F. Supp. at 1383).
The DiCarlantonio decision may seem contrary to the holding in United States v. Staszcuk,
517 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc), where the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld a conviction for extortion without actual effect on interstate commerce. See supra notes
74-86 and accompanying text. Staszcuk, however, was not decided on a depletion of assets
theory, and the victimized development company was engaged in interstate commerce. Once
the zoning restrictions were modified, an effect on interstate commerce was at least theoretically
possible. See Staszcuk, 502 F.2d at 878 n.8, affd in part on reh'g, rev'd in part on reh'g, 517 F.2d
53 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Staszcuk., 517 F.2d at 57 n.10 (en banc) (citations omitted).
Staszcuk's victim had paid the cash, completing the extortive transaction, but a subsequent
change of plans halted construction before an effect on interstate commerce could be realized.
In DiCarlantonio, on the other hand, "appellants' failure to carry out the objects of their scheme
meant that interstate commerce was in no way affected by the scheme. [The use of FBI money]
did not take any funds out of the stream of commerce, nor did it increase or decrease the flow of
propane." 870 F.2d at 1061.
180. 631 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1980). Rindone involved the conviction of a city electrical inspec-
tor on charges of extortion and attempted extortion for a $100 payment obtained from a contrac-
tor under color of official right. See id. at 492.
181. See id. at 493 (citing numerous cases).
182. Id. at 494 (quoting Staszcuk, 517 F.2d at 60); see United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d
1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. McKenna, 889 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (1st Cit. 1989); DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d at 1061. The
DiCarlantonio court pointed out that the Hobbs Act provided for attempted and completed
extortive transactions with equal severity, and concluded that adoption of the Rindone court's
reasoning would not unduly burden law enforcement. See 870 F.2d at 1061.
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ceipt of government funds."'183
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit returned a similar
holding in United States v. Brantley, in which the court affirmed the
defendants' convictions for conspiracy to extort but reversed the ex-
tortion convictions. 184 The FBI had set up a fictitious gambling opera-
tion, moving undercover agents, gaming equipment, cash, and liquor
into the state in order to investigate reports of local corruption; the
sheriff was paid to protect the illegal casino. 185 In rejecting the gov-
ernment's contention that the operation satisfied the jurisdictional el-
ement of the Hobbs Act, the court explained that the transactions
relied upon to establish jurisdiction were mere "pretense."' 186 The
Court of Appeals was simply unwilling to affirm the convictions for
extortion where government agents had "manufacture[d] jurisdiction
by contrived or pretensive means.' 87 The court distinguished Brant-
ley from an earlier holding in United States v. Santoni,188 a case in
which the FBI had set up a similarly fictitious operation to ferret out
suspected corruption in the awarding of city contracts. The cleaning
company in Santoni, as the Brantley court explained, was a going con-
cern engaged in commercial operations. 18 9 The jurisdictional predi-
cate of the Hobbs Act was thus satisfied in Santoni based on
legitimate transactions, albeit transactions conducted by an FBI-or-
ganized corporate shell.
None of the cases cited above would have proved helpful to the
Stillos. For, both jurisdictional and substantive purposes, the Stillos'
conspiracy to extort was complete at the moment of agreement: "All
that was necessary, in addition to an overt act, was that the intended
future conduct [the defendants] had agreed upon include all the ele-
ments of the substantive crime."' 190 It is firmly established that a de-
183. DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d at 1061.
184. See 777 F.2d 159, 161 (4th Cir. 1985).
185. See id.
186. See id. at 162; see also id. at 163 ("There is nothing in [the cited] cases, however, to
suggest that the necessary commercial connection may be shown by producing a child of
fantasy.").
187. Id. at 163 (citing United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 681-82 (2d Cir. 1973)).
188. 585 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1978).
189. See Brantley, 777 F.2d at 162; Santoni, 585 F.2d at 670; see also supra note 123 (discuss-
ing Santoni).
190. United States v. Rose, 590 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1978). It was likewise of no benefit to
Judge Stillo that Cooley had made the initial overtures. In Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,
256 (1992), affg 910 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1990), the Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the
circuits on the question of whether an affirmative act of inducement by an official was necessary
to sustain a conviction for extortion under color of official right. The Court held that such an act
was not necessary. See id. The Stillo trial court referred to United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d
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fendant accused of violating the Hobbs Act need not be aware that his
conduct will affect interstate commerce: the conspirators need only
agree to an act, "the natural effect of which will be to affect interstate
commerce." 191 It is likewise settled that the factual impossibility of an
effect on interstate commerce because FBI money is used is no de-
fense to a charge of attempted extortion or conspiracy to extort.
192
The jurisdictional analysis proceeds on the basis of reasonable
probabilities at the moment of agreement.193
Whatever the mixture of legitimate and illegitimate transactions
engaged in by Cooley during the operation of his firm's affairs,194 the
government established at trial that Cooley had operated a law prac-
tice both prior to and following the Hess transaction. 195 Pursuant to
its operations, Cooley's firm had regularly purchased goods traveling
in interstate commerce. 196 The participation by Cooley's firm in some
legitimate business transactions was thus sufficient, under Brantley
and Santoni, to permit prosecutors to defeat attacks on the use of FBI
funds in the operation.197 The Stillos' objection to jurisdiction on this
basis would not stand in any circuit.
139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974), in which the court held that the extortive transaction fell within the
scope of the Hobbs Act so long as the bribe was motivated by the recipient's office. See United
States v. Stillo, No. 91 CR 795-1-2, 1992 WL 297388, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 1992), affd, 57 F.3d
553 (7th Cir. 1995).
191. Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660, 673 (8th Cir. 1941); see also Hulahan v. United
States, 214 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1954); United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524, 525 (2d Cir.
1941).
192. See United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing United States
v. Beilomini, 454 F. Supp. 44, 47 (W.D. Pa. 1978) ("The fact that the business enterprise was
frustrated at a later time through failure of finances does not constitute a defense to a charge of
attempt to extort money in violation of the Hobbs Act."); United States v. Brooklier, 459 F.
Supp. 476, 479 (C.D. Cal. 1978) ("[Wlhile legal impossibility is a defense to a charge of attempt,
factual impossibility is not.")); see also supra note 123 (discussing Bellomini and Brooklier).
193. See United States v. Knox, 68 F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nor. Car-
reiro v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 926 (1996); United States v. Hocking, 860 F.2d 769, 777 (7th Cir.
1988); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 590-94 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc); Rindone, 631 F.2d
at 493-94.
194. See United States v. Jones, 30 F.3d 276, 284-86 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that robbery
during illegal drug sale affected interstate commerce because it depleted the assets of the victim
drug dealer, thereby affecting the victim's ability to purchase additional cocaine which necessar-
ily travels in interstate commerce); United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 783 (7th Cir. 1979)
("We can find no cases stating that legitimate commercial activity is drawn outside the coverage
of the Hobbs Act when it is conducted together with a much more profitable illegal business.").
195. See United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Shields, 999 F.2d 1090, 1093-96 (7th Cir. 1993).
196. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558; see also Govt. Br., supra note 140, at 38-40.
197. See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
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3. Use of the Depletion of Assets Theory Where the Money Is
Provided by a Private Party
The Stillos' attorneys argued that because Cooley was using Hess'
money to pay the bribe, the assets of Cooley's firm were not impli-
cated in the alleged scheme. 198 The court replied that the conspiracy
between the two Stillos was in place before Cooley's meeting with
Joseph Stillo, at which the "facts" and financial arrangements of the
Hess case were finally disclosed. The extortive scheme was thus es-
tablished before Hess entered the picture. The court noted, "[i]t is the
potential effect on interstate commerce at the time of the offense
which is relevant. Later developments which negate or lower the po-
tential effect on interstate commerce do not undermine the jurisdic-
tional element."'199 Alternately, the court suggested that "even if the
Stillos believed from the start that Hess would ultimately be footing
the bill, the temporary depletion of Cooley's assets and the risk of
non-payment would be sufficient to satisfy the de minimis interstate
commerce requirement. ' '200
Early cases such as United States v. Provenzano, United States v.
Amabile, and United States v. Auguello established the proposition,
settled since the mid-1970s,20 that the assets depleted must be those
of an enterprise.20 2 One frequently-cited holding states:
Under the depletion of assets theory, commerce is affected when an
enterprise, which either is actively engaged in interstate commerce
or customarily purchases items in interstate commerce, has its assets
depleted through extortion, thereby curtailing the victim's potential
as a purchaser of such goods .... Although the Act requires only a
de minimis effect on commerce, the effect still must be more than a
speculative, attenuated 'one step removed' kind of effect.20 3
Not surprisingly, defendants have often claimed, in an attempt to
negate jurisdiction, that the victim was extorted as a private citizen or
198. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558.
199. Id. at 558 (citing United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc)
(noting again the 'realistic probability' to 'potential effect')).
200. Id. at 558-59 (citing United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 365 (7th Cir. 1986)).
201. See, for example, the discussions and authority cited in United States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d
1402, 1404 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jackson, 748 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Boston,, 718 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501
(9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Merolla, 523 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 396 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Nelson, 486 F. Supp. 464, 470-71
(N.D. Mich. 1980); United States v. Bryson, 418 F. Supp. 818, 824-25 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Biondo, 483 F.2d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1973) ("The law is well
settled in this regard."); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 60, 77 (3d Cir. 1971); United
States v. Esperti, 406 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1969).
203. United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1978). But see infra notes 261-64.
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used personal funds to satisfy the demand. 20 4 Equally unsurprisingly,
such efforts have been largely unsuccessful. Those rare instances in
which a defendant has escaped conviction have often involved situa-
tions where the extorted assets were unrelated to the business en-
gaged in interstate commerce, or where the extortive transaction or
robbery was clearly unrelated to the victim's role in organizations or
enterprises so engaged. 20
5
The Stillos were charged with, and ultimately, convicted of, con-
spiracy to extort. Thus, the question of who would "ultimately be
footing the bill" required only the identification of a commercial
source with funds reasonably tied to interstate commerce. 20 6 In this
instance, that source was Robert Cooley "in his professional
capacity. '2
07
The Court of Appeals relied on United States v. Lewis,208 in which
the defendant was charged with attempted extortion of funds from a
204. See, e.g., United States v. Bengali, 11 F.3d 1207, 1212 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 293-94 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. DeParias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1450-51
(11th Cir. 1986); United States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1191-92 (1st Cir. 1979); United
States v. Rabbitt 583 F.2d 1014, 1023 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Auguello, 451 F.2d 1163,
1169-70 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
205. See, e.g., Buffey, 899 F.2d at 1404-07 (finding that extortion based on the victim's per-
sonal indiscretions suggested that the victim would pay with private funds rather than risk prob-
able discovery by using corporate assets); United States v. Colins, 40 F.3d 95, 97, 99-101 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that robbery at gun point and theft of victim salesman's private auto and
mobile telephone were insufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction); United States v. Mattson, 671
F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[The victim] was not conducting a business engaged in, or
purchasing items from, interstate commerce. The victim in this case was an individual who had
no connection with interstate commerce at all, but whose only connection was with a business
which was engaged in interstate commerce."); Elders, 569 F.2d at 1024-25 (finding no federal
jurisdiction where the assets depleted were those of a business in the process of being dissolved,
and thus, there was no realistic probability of affecting goods traveling in interstate commerce);
Merolla, 523 F.2d at 54-55 (finding no federal jurisdiction where the victim was engaged in a
one-time operation with no realistic probability of future purchases of goods traveling in inter-
state commerce); United States v. Blair, 762 F. Supp. 1384, 1387-94 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding
that withdrawal of $12,000 from victim's personal bank account was insufficient to establish fed-
eral jurisdiction where the funds were not linked in any meaningful way to interstate commerce,
citing numerous cases); United States v. Kaye, 593 F. Supp. 193, 197-99 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (finding
no federal jurisdiction where the victim paid with personal assets and where the indictment
failed to charge the victim's employer as an object of the extortion).
206. United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Staszcuk,
517 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc); see also United States v. DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d 1058,
1061 (6th Cir. 1989) ("While a substantive Hobbs Act violation requires an actual effect on
interstate commerce, a conspiracy charge requires the government to prove only that the defend-
ants' scheme would have affected commerce."); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 591-94
(3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (a federal interest sufficient to support federal jurisdiction is implicated
at the moment when defendants agree to do acts which, if attainable, would affect interstate
commerce); Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660, 673 (8th Cir. 1941).
207. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 560.
208. 797 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Stillo, 57 F.3d at 559.
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corporation directly engaged in interstate commerce. 20 9 Defendant
Lewis had argued in part that because he had no intent to obtain the
extorted funds for himself, he could not be held culpable under the
Hobbs Act. The Court of Appeals responded that "loss to the victim
is the gravamen of the offense. ' 210 Where the victim enterprise
agreed, however provisionally or temporarily, to the extortive scheme,
the "temporary loss of the use of money constitute[d] a deprivation of
property under [section] 1951."211
The Stillo indictment frames the fictive Hess case as merely an
opportunity for the Stillos to put their scheme into operation against
Cooley:212 the Stillos conspired "among themselves to obtain an
amount of money from Robert J. Cooley, with his consent, said con-
sent being induced under color of official right .... ",213 Establishing
jurisdiction required that Cooley, not Hess, be the victim. Once, how-
ever, Cooley consented in principle to pay for future favorable rulings,
the assets of his firm were irrevocably bound. 214 The Stillo court con-
cluded that Cooley's firm thereby lost (albeit an entirely theoretical
loss) the use of an undetermined portion of its assets for the purchase
of goods from companies engaged in interstate commerce. As the
court noted, the jury's conclusion must have reflected their belief that
Cooley's professional assets were implicated in the scheme, based on
the probable liability of his law firm for Cooley's illegitimate business
obligations.215 Federal jurisdiction was thereby affirmed.2 16
209. See Lewis, 797 F.2d at 362-64.
210. Id. at 364.
211. Id. at 365.
212. See Indictment, supra note 1, at Count 11, 2-7. It is arguable that an argument obvi-
ously not set forth or suggested by the government that the Stillos and Cooley were co-conspira-
tors intent on preying on a series of hapless private "victims" such as Hess. Under such
circumstances the depletion of assets theory could not be utilized as a means to establish federal
jurisdiction. Curiously, the government's framing of the scheme is not undercut by the facts set
forth in Joseph Stillo's appellate brief. See J. Stillo Br., supra note 94, at 3-25 (statement of
facts). Following Cooley's decision to work with the government as an informant, he ap-
proached Judge Stillo in chambers regarding the fictitious Hess case. See id. at 5, 7. Cooley
informed the Judge that he had a case "coming up.... Judge Stillo said, 'See my nephew do you
know my nephew, Joey; see my nephew Joey.' . . . While Cooley had seen Joe around before,
Cooley and Joe Stillo were not friends, and did not have any prior dealings with each other." Id.
at 7. The facts are presumably intended to suggest that Joseph was merely a hapless victim; an
equally plausible interpretation, however, is that the Judge and Joseph were in league. As the
government pointed out in its Response Brief, "[T]he jury was entitled to draw the obvious
inference that the Stillos had agreed together to extort money from Cooley." Govt. Br., supra
note 140, at 36.
213. Indictment, supra note 1, at Count II 2.
214. See United States v. Stillo, No. 91 CR 795-1-2, 1993 WL 565988, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan 26,
1994); see also United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 1995).
215. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 560 (citing United States v. Hocking, 860 F.2d 769, 776-77 (7th Cir.
1988) for the proposition that "the jury need only find that [the] payor of the bribe represented a
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The Hobbs Act requirement that the assets depleted must be
those of an enterprise or an organization customarily engaging in in-
terstate commerce reflects a recognition that businesses or organiza-
tions purchase such goods in more substantial quantities more
regularly than do individuals.2 17 It is possible that the Supreme
Court's renewed attention to federalism may lend indirect support to
the position that the assets depleted must be those of an enterprise or
organization.218 The Court has recently clarified its understanding of
Commerce Clause case law decided since NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel.219 Based on the perceived necessity to establish some limitation
on the scope of congressional action, the Court has seized the oppor-
tunity to emphasize the "commercial" nature of the activities or trans-
actions properly regulable by Congress under the Commerce
Clause.220 This emphasis seems far more in harmony with an interpre-
tation of the Hobbs Act's jurisdictional element that is linked to a
depletion of commercial, rather than private, assets.2 21
business which purchased goods from out of state and that the bribe was paid on behalf of the
business").
216. See id. at 555.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 589-90 (7th Cir. 1982); see also
supra note 205; infra note 221 and cases cited therein. But see Expansion, supra note 14, at 315
(explaining that enterprises and organizations that are the victims of robbery and extortion are
far more likely to replace or continue to purchase goods traveling in interstate commerce, in
order to satisfy their clients, than are than are similarly situated individuals, who may simply go
without).
218. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also infra Section III.C.4.
219. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
220. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 561-62, 566-67.
221. Courts have regularly and consistently reaffirmed the position that the assets depleted
must be those of an organization or enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396,
398 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Commerce is affected when an enterprise, which either is actively engaged
in interstate commerce or customarily purchases items in interstate commerce, has its assets
depleted .... thereby curtailing the victim's potential as a purchaser of such goods.") (alteration
in original); United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v.
Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 293-94 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing cases where the payment of the extortive
demands with ostensibly personal funds nevertheless linked the victim to an organization en-
gaged in interstate commerce); United States v. Norris, 792 F.2d 956, 958 (10th Cir. 1986) ("A
mere 'depletion of assets' of a firm engaged in interstate commerce will meet the [jurisdictional]
requirement."); Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 590 ("[B]usinesses [generally] purchase on a larger scale
than individuals.... That is the pragmatic justification for drawing the line between individuals
and businesses or other enterprises so far as applying the depletion-of-assets theory is con-
cerned .. "); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1023 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding federal
jurisdiction where the victim paid with personal assets but was "acting on behalf of" and was
reimbursed by an organization engaged in interstate commerce); United States v. Flores, 855 F.
Supp. 638, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]he government is still required to prove that the assets of an
enterprise that conducts business in interstate commerce were depleted by the crime."). Explo-
ration of the power of the agent to bind the principal or the partnership, as well as the assets of
the principal or partnership, are beyond the scope of this Comment. It is arguable that applica-
tion of the depletion of assets theory in situations where the agency relationship is absent will
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4. The Stillo Court's Response to United States v. Lopez and the
"Substantially Affects" Interstate Commerce Requirement
In late April 1995, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had
"exceeded [its] power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. '222
United States v. Lopez223 involved the conviction of a high school stu-
dent for possession of a gun within a thousand feet of a public school.
The federal statute under which Lopez was convicted, the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, contained no provision linking the posses-
sion of firearms to interstate commerce. 224 A search of the Act's leg-
islative history likewise revealed no indication that the bill's sponsors
had considered the effects of the proscribed conduct upon interstate
commerce. 225 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, holding that
require the courts to rethink the principles implicated in this means to establish federal
jurisdiction.
222. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. The Court's 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937), ushered in the Court's "watershed" opinion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,
301 U.S. 1 (1937), signaling a more expansive view of the federal power under the Commerce
Clause. The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), was the first instance since that period in which the Court ruled Congress had over-
stepped its Commerce Clause authority. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 8.6 n.18, § 8.7 nn.25-32 and accompanying text (2d ed. 1988); Stephen Chippendale, supra
note 11, at 460 n.28. However, National League of Cities, which overturned the holding but not
the commerce clause analysis, of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), was itself overturned
nine years later by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 558
(1985) ("[Sltate sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power.'). See Chippendale, supra note 11, at 460 n.28; David S. Gehrig, The Gun Free Schools
Act: The Shootout Over Legislative Findings, the Commerce Clause, and Federalism, 22 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L. Q. 179, 192-93 (1994). In 1992, the Court ruled in New York v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), that Congress had overreached its constitutional powers by requiring that
states enact legislation to keep and dispose of their own low-level nuclear waste.
223. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
224. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702(a), 104 Stat. 4789,
4844-45 (codified as amended at §§ 922 and 924 (1993) (prior to 1994 Amendment) [hereinafter
School Zones Act]. Under the School Zones Act, possession of a firearm with 1000 feet of a
public, private, or parochial school is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years and fines
of up to $5,000. See id.; United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1346, 1348-60 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Hunter, 843 F. Supp. 235, 246-49 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
225. Compare United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Colo. 1994) rev'd by 56
F.3d 78 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing official testimony by police chief at House Subcommittee hear-
ings on proposed section 922(q) that gang members were bringing weapons into the Cleveland,
Ohio jurisdiction from out of state, were organizing local gangs, and therefore police were re-
questing federal help), with Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366 ("Neither the act itself nor its legislative his-
tory reflect any Congressional determination that the possession denounced by section 922(q) is
in any way related to interstate commerce or its regulation."). The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found significant the lack of findings or supportive legislative history, despite ac-
knowledgment that a lack of such findings was not dispositive of the statute's constitutionality.
See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366 n.49 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502-03 (1980) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
The School Zones Act was subsequently amended on Sept. 13, 1994, to include congres-
sional findings indicating the adverse effects of firearm possession in school zones upon inter-
state commerce; movement of firearms in interstate traffic; and an inability of the states to
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Congress had failed to do "what is necessary to locate [section] 922(q)
within the Commerce Clause," reversed Lopez's conviction.
2 26
Other courts disagreed,22 7 and in fairly quick order the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The Court affirmed the position taken in the
Fifth Circuit, holding that "the proper test" of congressional power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause "requires an analysis of whether
the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce....
Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained. ' 228 The Gun-Free
School Zones Act could not be upheld "under our cases upholding
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a com-
mercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially af-
fects interstate commerce. 22 9 Neither did the statute contain an
express jurisdictional element to ensure, on a case-by-case basis, that a
defendant's activities sufficiently affected interstate commerce. 230 The
Lopez Court noted an exception, consistent with the overall direction
of its holdings for the past fifty years: "[W]here a general regulatory
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis char-
acter of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence. " 231
handle this problem by themselves. See The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125 (1994).
226. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367. For a critical and largely skeptical analysis of the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning in Lopez, see Gehrig, supra note 222, at 194-208.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 295 & n.4 (9th Cir.), vacated by 115 S.
Ct. 1819 (1993) ("With respect, we believe the Fifth Circuit has misrepresented, or refused to
follow, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court that are binding on all courts inferior
to our nation's highest court."); United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327, 1334-36 (D. Kan.),
rev'd by 57 F.3d 1081 (1994); United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1092-94 (D. Colo.),
rev'd by 56 F.3d 78 (1994); United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 365-66 (N.D. Ala. 1993)
("Congress may be able to invent a convincing relationship between the proscription in section
922(q) and its right to regulate interstate commerce, but this court should not be called upon to
dream it up for Congress."); Gehrig, supra note 222, at 202-08 (citing numerous cases).
228. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. The Court's analysis of the School Zones Act focused on con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause to regulate activities "having a substantial rela-
tionship to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce." Id. at 1629-30 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968)). Compare id. ("activities having a substantial rela-
tion to interstate commerce"), with Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) ("those
activities affecting commerce"). The Lopez majority concluded that the School Zones Act was a
criminal statute unrelated to commerce or economic enterprise. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-561.
229. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
230. See id. at 562 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339, 349 n.4 (1971); United
States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448 (1953)).
231. Id. at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)); see also United
States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting same).
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Joseph Stillo submitted the Lopez decision to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit following oral argument in Stillo,232 but
the court deemed the decision unpersuasive. 233 The court noted that
the Hobbs Act, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, was directed
at a type of economic activity-extortion. 234 The court also observed
that unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Hobbs Act contained
an express jurisdictional element that served to limit the reach of the
statute to a "discrete set of [offenses] that additionally have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce. ' 235 The Court of
Appeals concluded that Lopez had not "undermine[d] this [c]ourt's
precedent that minimal potential effect on commerce is all that need
be proven to support a conviction," quoting the Wirtz passage noted
in Lopez.
2 3 6
The court briefly referred to United States v. Robertson,237 a per
curiam Supreme Court opinion handed down one week after Lopez,
as "more relevant" to its consideration of Stillo's argument. 238 On
what basis Robertson is more relevant, however, is unclear. Robertson
involved the defendant's purchase and operation of an Alaskan gold
mine with funds derived from narcotics sales. 239 Defendant Robert-
son, an Arizona resident, paid $125,000 in cash for the mining claims,
then spent an additional $100,000 for equipment and supplies, a por-
tion of which were purchased in California and transported to Alaska.
Robertson also hired as many as seven out-of-state laborers over sev-
eral seasons to work the claims. During that period, the mine pro-
duced between $200,000 and $290,000 worth of gold, approximately
$30,000 of which the defendant personally transported out of
Alaska.240 The Robertson Court did not address the issue of whether
the mine's operation "affected commerce" since the evidence sup-
ported a finding that the enterprise was operating directly in interstate
or foreign commerce. The Stillo court's reference to United States v.
Robertson is therefore puzzling. Defendant Robertson was engaged
directly and substantially in interstate commerce, whereas the Stillos
had argued that interstate commerce would not be substantially af-
232. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558; see id. n.2.
233. See id.
234. See id.; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-562.
235. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558 n.2; see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-562.
236. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558 n.2 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)).
237. 514 U.S. 669 (1995).
238. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558 n.2.
239. Robertson, 514 U.S. at 669. The StiUo court mistakenly identified defendant Robert-
son's purchase as a silver mine. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558 n.2.
240. See Robertson, 514 U.S. at 670.
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fected by an unrealized, undetermined, de minimis depletion of a law
firm's assets, and thus, jurisdiction could not be sustained.
While the StiUo court dismissed Lopez in a single footnote, 241 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered the Court's holding
at somewhat greater length. In United States v. Bolton242 the defend-
ant had been arrested and convicted for a series of robberies that net-
ted approximately $4,300.243 Like Joseph Stillo, defendant Bolton
argued that the Lopez decision invalidated prior Hobbs Act holdings
requiring only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. After a
brief review of pertinent case law,244 the Court of Appeals set forth its
reasoning: "[T]he Court recognized that if a statute regulates an activ-
ity which, through repetition, in aggregate has a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce, 'the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.' "245 The
court first asserted that "the Hobbs Act regulates activities which in
aggregate have a substantial effect on interstate commerce"; that rob-
bery and extortion are a class of activities that, through repetition,
may have a substantial and detrimental effect on interstate commerce;
and that because the Act "regulates activities" having such an effect,
the de minimis character of individual instances are of no conse-
quence. The Bolton court, like the Stillo court, concluded that the de
minimis effects theory remained untouched by the Supreme Court's
holding.2
46
Congressional power to reach ostensibly private activity of trivial
economic consequence was settled by the Supreme Court in Wickard
241. See Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558 n.2.
242. 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995).
243. See id. at 397. The defendant robbed four businesses for a total of approximately $4,100
and robbed a private party of his credit cards, which were later sold for $250. See id.
244. See id. at 398-99 (citing United States v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486, 489 (10th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Boston, 718 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d
1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1978)).
245. Bolton, 68 F.3d at 399 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).
246. Id. The Bolton court quoted the Stillo f otnote as supporting authority for its analysis.
See also United States v. Edwards, 894 F. Supp. 340, 343 (E.D. Wis. 1995) ("In United States v.
Stillo the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that the Lopez decision did not 'under-
mine this Court's precedents that minimal potential effect on commerce is all that need be
proven to support a conviction.' (Holding that the Hobbs Act, which prohibits extortion that
affects interstate commerce, is constitutional).") Such citations suggest that legal accretions are
already forming around the Stillo court's "analysis" of the Lopez holding. See, e.g., United
States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th Cir. 1995) (involving Commerce Clause challenge to
the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970);
United States v. Arena, 918 F. Supp. 561, 567 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) ("This court agrees with Bolton
[and Stillo] that the 'Hobbs Act regulates activities which in aggregate have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce,' and therefore 'the de minimis character of individual instances arising
under [this] statute is of no consequence."') (citations omitted).
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v. Filburn247 and reaffirmed in Perez v. United States.248 Nonetheless,
the Bolton court's "analysis" to the contrary, the Hobbs Act cannot
fairly be characterized as a regulatory statute, 249 at least in the same
sense that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,250 the subject statute
in Maryland v. Wirtz, 251 may be considered regulatory. Wirtz involved
the constitutionality of a federal labor statute as applied to school and
hospital employees operated by the states and their subdivisions: the
question raised was whether the federal government had the power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate the wages, terms, and work-
ing conditions of certain state workers "employed in an enterprise en-
gaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce. '252 The
litigants had stipulated that the affected schools and hospitals were
"major users" of goods traveling in interstate commerce, and that la-
bor unrest, unfortunately "not infrequent, obviously interrupt[s] and
burden[s] this flow of goods across state lines. '253 In determining
whether the statute was a valid regulation of commerce, the Court
noted in passing:
[A]n "enterprise" is a set of operations whose activities in com-
merce would all be expected to be affected by the wages and hours
of any group of employees, which is what Congress obviously in-
tended. So defined, the term is quite cognizant of limitations on the
commerce power. Neither here nor in Wickard had the Court de-
clared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on com-
merce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private
activities. The Court has said only that where a general regulatory
247. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Wickard court held, "[T]hat appellee's own contribu-
tion ... may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where ... his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial." Id. at 127-28.
248. 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) ("Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual
instances' of the class.") (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)).
249. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted this point in United States v.
Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 58 (7th Cir. 1975) ("The [Hobbs Act] is not regulatory in character, but
instead is intended to remove artificial restraints on the free flow of goods.").
250. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-07 & 216 (1964 & Supp. II).
251. 392 U.S. 183, 185-87 (1968). The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional element cannot be satisfied
by reference to congressional findings regarding a class of proscribed activities, as in Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (Consumer Credit Protection Act). While there is general
agreement that congressional findings are not necessary to sustain the constitutionality of a stat-
ute, it seems unclear from the Supreme Court's holding in Lopez how, short of aggressive judi-
cial review, the courts are to determine for themselves whether instances of robbery or
extortion, or robbery and extortion as classes of activities, substantially affect interstate com-
merce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[R]eview
for congressional wisdom would just be the old judicial pretension discredited and abandoned in
1937 ....").
252. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a) (1964 & Supp. II).
253. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 194-95.
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statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis
character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence.
254
In short, Wirtz simply did not address the issues raised by the
Stillo or Bolton courts. Neither did the Bolton court develop any basis
for its comparison between the Hobbs Act and the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938. While the Wirtz Court reaffirmed its earlier hold-
ings in Wickard25 5 and United States v. Darby,256 it refused to be
drawn into a general discussion of issues unframed by the litigation.
257
Nonetheless, a review of post-Lopez case law suggests that, at least
insofar as the Hobbs Act is concerned, United States v. Lopez is rap-
idly being limited to its facts: Lopez is frequently cited both for the
Wirtz passage and its "aggregate effects" analysis.
258
United States v. Stillo illustrates the current scope of federal juris-
diction under the Hobbs Act. The court's analysis also suggests the
manner in which the Act's jurisdictional requirements have been re-
laxed over the last half-century. Where indictments are shaped to en-
sure general conformity with current case law, and where cases are
prosecuted under a broadly worded and generously interpreted stat-
ute, few defendants escape the reach of the statute. As the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted in United States v. Murphy, "in
a complex economy almost any movement of funds affects commerce
to some degree. ' 259 A district court in the Second Circuit recently
sustained federal jurisdiction under the Child Support Recovery Act
where the assets depleted were private assets. 260 The Court of Ap-
254. Id. at 196 n.27 (quoted in United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073, 1077 (2d Cir. 1970),
affd, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
255. See id. at 192-93 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)).
256. 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941).
257. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 199.
258. See, e.g., United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Arena,
894 F. Supp. 580 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding federal jurisdiction where anti-abortion activist
attacked a Planned Parenthood clinic and thereby depleted the assets available to the clinic with
which to purchase goods traveling in interstate commerce); United States v. Edwards, 894 F.
Supp. 340 (E.D. Wis. 1995); see also United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1448-49 (6th Cir. 1996)
(noting correctly that "most courts have resisted urgings to extend Lopez beyond § 922(q).").
259. 768 F.2d 1518, 1531 (7th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606-11
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing "the 'hopeless porosity' of 'commercial' character as a
ground of Commerce Clause distinction in America's highly connected economy").
260. See United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 784 (1997) (involving a challenge to the constitutionality of the
Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1995) ["CSRA"].). The court noted:
[T]he non-payment of the 'past due support obligation' will reduce the child's con-
sumption of goods in interstate commerce. It will also reduce the custodial parent's
consumption of such goods to the extent any alimony is included in the support obliga-
tion. Thus, the very act of withholding payment causes a depletion of assets that affects
interstate commerce.
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peals for the Ninth Circuit has sustained Hobbs Act jurisdiction based
on a similarly distant effect on interstate commerce: the economic ef-
fect on a corporation of an employee's potentially diminished work
performance because of stress related to extortive demands.261 The
demands stemmed from personal misconduct unrelated to the victim's
corporate responsibilities. 262 The appellate court's reasoning is thin; it
is also distressingly reminiscent of the "national productivity" argu-
ment rejected by the Supreme Court as an impermissible attempt by
Congress to regulate activities tied, however remotely, to the "eco-
nomic productivity of individual citizens. '263 It is not clear, then, that
the preservation of the federal balance may any more prudently be
remitted to the unelected and far less closely-scrutinized wisdom of
the judiciary than it may be "remitted to the political judgment of
Congress. '2 64 If jurisdiction can now be secured on the basis of an
Id. at 90; see also United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); United
States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 838 n.ll (E.D. Pa. 1995); cf. United States v. Harding, 563
F.2d 299, 307 (6th Cir. 1977) (sustaining federal jurisdiction where the victim did not participate
in interstate commerce but the victim's clients did). The CSRA continues to withstand constitu-
tional attack. See, e.g., United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1006 (10th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 108 (2d
Cir. 1996).
261. See United States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving the extor-
tion of personal funds from a salesman employed by a corporation engaged in interstate com-
merce). The Court of Appeals upheld jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act despite the fact that the
victim, who had engaged in personal indiscretions, was extorted as a private citizen rather than
as an agent of an organization engaged in interstate commerce. See id. at 1035-36; see also id. at
1039-41 (Ferguson, C.J., dissenting). The Pascucci court recited well-known Hobbs Act case law
and "principles," none of which appeared to support the propositions advanced by the court. Id.
at 1035. It then announced that federal jurisdiction under the Act had been established. The
court's reasoning is unclear, as the dissent observes. See id. at 1039-41. Compare id. at 1035,
and United States v. Frost, 61 F.3d 1518, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding federal jurisdiction
where the victim was extorted in order to force his resignation from the city council, "the actions
of... [which organization], at least to a minimal degree affect interstate commerce") and United
States v. Huynh, 60 F.3d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e have upheld Hobbs Act convictions
even where the defendant sought to extort only personal assets.") (citing Pascucci, 943 F.2d at
1035) and United States v. Jones, 30 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The result is the same
whether Ortiz was a government agent or a private individual known to be engaged in narcotics
trafficking; in either case, such person's assets were depleted, thus affecting his ability to
purchase a commodity [cocaine] that travels in interstate commerce.") with United States v.
Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding lack of federal jurisdiction where "[t]he
victim ... was an individual who had no connection with interstate commerce at all, but whose
only connection was with a business which was engaged in interstate commerce").
262. See United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1978) ("Although the Act
requires only a de minimis effect on commerce, the effect still must be more than a speculative,
attenuated 'one step removed' kind of effect.").
263. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-65 (1995).
264. Id. at 1632-33.
None of us at least can think of anything under our present case law, or at least under
your argument, that Congress can't do if it chooses under the Commerce Clause, so if
the Federal system is to be preserved by someone, and the Commerce Clause is a
means by which the Federal structure can be obliterated, and if we have no tools or
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agreement to engage in conduct, the possible effect of which involves
the "depletion" or utilization of an organization's pecuniary and non-
pecuniary assets, or if the depletion of assets theory now includes both
personal and commercial assets, it is difficult to imagine that any con-
duct suggested by the Act is beyond the federal reach.
The principles on which United States v. Stillo was decided are
largely familiar to court and counsel alike. Perhaps as a consequence,
Hobbs Act jurisdictional decisions are based on little more than a
handful of quotations or parenthetical comments, all of which have
been released from the contexts that, at the outset, illuminated and
limited their meanings. While the jurisdictional predicate of the stat-
ute is intended to require that the government establish a nexus to
interstate commerce on a case-by-case basis,265 a review of Hobbs Act
case law reveals a remarkable lack of rigor and precision in the han-
dling of this element. The theoretically limited scope of federal inter-
vention at least with respect to the Hobbs Act, seems largely
rhetorical.2 66
The task of statutory interpretation, including the question of ju-
risdiction, involves difficult choices between competing values. To say
that Congress intended the Hobbs Act to reach to the limit of its
power under the Commerce Clause begs the questions of the extent of
that reach and how its measure is to be determined. While the Hobbs
analytic techniques to make these distinctions, then it follows that the Federal balance
is remitted to the political judgment of the Congress.
Oral Arguments Transcript, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260), 1994 WL
758950, at *18-19 (Nov. 8, 1994). The Majority's concern for this potentially vast expansion of
congressional power was apparently not fully addressed by the dissenters. See Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 563-67, 598-601, 622-26; see also Transcripts, supra, at *5-6, 10-13, 15-16, 22-24; Deborah
Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 678-82 (1995).
Judge Ferguson, dissenting in United States v. Pascucci, likewise noted that if federal juris-
diction were sustainable based merely on an adverse effect on job performance, "the vast major-
ity of employers would be found to have businesses related to interstate commerce." 943 F.2d at
1040.
265. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336, 339, 349 n.4 (1971); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448 (1953)); cf.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 310-11 (1981) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937));
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960). In Hodel Justice Renquist stated:
[I]t would be a mistake to conclude that Congress' power to regulate pursuant to the
Commerce Clause is unlimited. Some activities may be so private or local in nature
that they simply may not be in commerce. Nor is it sufficient that the person or activity
reached have some nexus with interstate commerce. Our cases have consistently held
that the regulated activity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 310-11.
266. See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595, 597 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding federal
jurisdiction where defendants conspired to rob the safety deposit boxes of a hotel that enter-
tained large numbers of out of state guests).
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Act was originally intended to halt certain illegal labor practices and
racketeering activities that burdened interstate commerce, it has been
applied to a range of criminal conduct far beyond that considered in
the legislative debates. The courts have, however, occasionally re-
turned to labor law holdings, including Maryland v. Wirtz,267 to inter-
pret the Act:268 the grudging narrowness occasionally exhibited by
the judiciary in interpreting federal labor legislation, likewise the ex-
pressed will of the electorate, is revealing and stands in stark contrast
to the relative enthusiasm displayed in extending the federal reach
under the Hobbs Act.
269
An appellate court recently suggested that the case then before
the bar, a bungled robbery of a local tavern, might have been more
sensibly prosecuted under state law.270 Federal jurisdiction had been
easily established, but the court questioned the prosecutors' resort to
the Hobbs Act:
[W]e are unable to fathom why the United States felt compelled to
pursue this prosecution .... [T]he United States could in theory
prosecute virtually every would-be thief... no matter how trivial
the amount at issue.... Nevertheless, we recognize that any change
must come from Congress rather than the courts.
271
This is not entirely correct. It is true that Congress and not the
courts bear responsibility for enacting legislation. It is also true that
the courts bear no responsibility for the wisdom of that legislation. As
this Comment has attempted to demonstrate, however, it is not true
that the courts are without responsibility for the current jurisdictional
reach of the Act.272 The speed with which the lower courts dispatched
267. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
268. See, e.g., sources cited in supra notes 13-16, 28, 30, 41, 62, 252, and 255-62.
269. See, e.g., supra notes 6, 14, 35, 43-52, 54-59, 80-85, 114-18, 139-41, 144, 148, 155-60,
222-25, and accompanying text. Compare sources cited supra, with, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977);
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443 (1921); Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 1996).
270. See United States v. Brown, 959 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Waters,
850 F. Supp. 1550, 1561-62 (N.D. Ala. 1994). Defendant Brown appealed his conviction and
sentencing "imposed for carrying a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence for
which he could be prosecuted in federal court [i.e., the Hobbs Act], and for possession of a
weapon by a convicted felon." Brown, 959 F.2d at 64. The tavern which the defendant at-
tempted to rob sold beer and snack food manufactured in other states. See id. Federal prosecu-
tion brought significantly stiffer sentencing. See id.
271. Brown, 959 F.2d at 69.
272. See, e.g., United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 1980) (sustaining
jurisdiction where defendant's extortive conduct "affected the quality of interstate commerce if
not its quantity"); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding federal
jurisdiction based on the sale of a real estate licensing exam and answers for $300 where the
victim's clients, but not the victim, were engaged in interstate commerce).
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United States v. Lopez in subsequent Hobbs Act holdings likewise sug-
gests the role they have played in extending federal jurisdiction: the
Lopez Court's de minimis "exceptions" language may soon become
the holding's most widely-quoted passage. 273
The law is applied to-ultimately, it is shaped on-the facts of the
litigation before the courts. When confronted by "a bad man full of
violent deeds" or other malefactors,274 very few jurists have inter-
preted the language of the Act, including its jurisdictional element, so
as to permit a defendant to escape. Insofar as anyone has an interest
in placing principled limits on federal action, it will take more than
congressional legislation. It will require an entirely different attitude
towards the exercise of federal power.
273. See supra notes 251, 263.
274. United States v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1959); see also United States v.
Kaye, 593 F. Supp. 193, 194 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("Kaye is as sleazy a human being as it is possible to
imagine.... [However,] though he has committed criminal acts, he is not federally reprehensible
and he did not commit federal criminal acts.").
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